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vAbstract
In order to recommend policies that promote representative government, political scientists and
politicians must understand how changes to the current political environment affect political behav-
ior. This dissertation analyzes how both opinion and policies affect political behavior in the context
of voting, campaign competition, and committees. Rational models of political behavior are used
to formulate hypotheses of political behavior and action. Testing models of political behavior the
author employs a wealth of methodological knowledge and expertise in national surveys, survey ex-
periments, laboratory experiments, computer simulations, and regression analysis. Results indicate
that rational models of political behavior can be used to develop accurate hypotheses of political
behavior. The conclusion of the second and third chapters is that voter opinions about the integrity
of the election process are significantly affected by decisions at the election administration level and
the outcome of elections. In laboratory experiments involving multimember committees results show
that committee procedures similar to Roberts’ Rules of Order reveal information held by biased,
privately informed experts. Additionally, information aggregation is higher in multimember com-
mittees with heterogeneous preferences when committee procedures allow for the formation of an
expert’s reputation. The fifth chapter presents empirical results that suggest individual campaign
contributions are positively and significantly affected by a candidate’s association with specific types
of social organizations. Finally, the sixth chapter presents results that show back-loaded primary
calendars are more likely to lead to greater interparty competition and more extreme general election
candidates.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis uses laboratory experiments, survey experiments, nationally representative surveys,
and theory to investigate and test rational models of political behavior.
The beginning of my dissertation focuses on the confidence American voters have in the election
process. The second chapter builds on the literature that investigates citizen and voter trust in
government, and analyzes the topic of voter confidence in the American electoral process. The data
comes from two national telephone surveys where voters were asked the confidence they have that
their vote for president in the 2004 election was recorded as intended. Preliminary evidence suggests
that confidence in the electoral process affects voter turnout. The subsequent examination estimates
the level of voter confidence and analyzes the characteristics that influence the likelihood that a voter
is confident that their ballot was recorded accurately. The analysis indicates significant differences
in the level of voter confidence along both racial and partisan lines. Finally, voter familiarity with
the electoral process and the specific technology the voter uses are found to significantly affect the
level of voter confidence.
The third chapter continues to develop and refine the concept of voter confidence. One of the
consistent findings of the voter confidence research literature is that in recent elections, relative to
Democrats, Republican voters tend to be more confident that their ballots are counted correctly.
However, it is the case that, in terms of the outcomes of the 2000 and 2004 elections at the national
level, Republicans were victorious. Research also suggests that, in the 2004 election, voters who cast
a paper ballot are more confident relative to those who vote using an electronic device. Although
these results fit nicely into the 2000 and 2004 elections, this chapter argues that future research of
voter confidence should interpret voter confidence within the context of the election. The particular
context of the 2006 election, gives rise to two testable hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that
a winner’s effect exists where following the election voters who cast their ballot for the winning
candidate are more confident that their vote was counted accurately. The second hypothesis is that
voter access to a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) device leads to higher rates of confidence
among electronic voters. Using a panel dataset containing self-reported confidence levels before and
2after the 2006 election, empirical evidence supports the conclusion that voter confidence is influenced
by the context of the election. First, evidence suggests a positive and significant winner’s effect;
following the 2006 election voter confidence is higher for individuals who voted for the winning
candidate. Second, empirical results support the conclusion that voters who cast ballots on an
electronic voting machine with a VVPAT device exhibit higher rates of confidence when compared
to electronic voters who do not have access to VVPAT devices. Finally, when measuring the change
in confidence rates before and after the election, there is no evidence of a significant difference in the
change in the confidence rates between electronic voters with access to a VVPAT device and voters
who cast a paper ballot.
The fourth chapter uses laboratory experiments to investigate information revelation in mul-
timember committees. This chapter analyzes the ability of committees to gather information and
select a single decision when faced with uncertainty about the consequences of their choice. Whether
in Congress or the local school board, committee member preferences are in general heterogeneous
and individual members often possess uncertainty over the mapping of decisions to outcomes; i.e.,
committee members are uncertain of their own preferences. Often in such cases of uncertainty,
the committee relies on information provided by self-interested experts. Using an experimental
design we test the hypothesis that committee procedures similar to Robert’s Rules of Order trans-
mit information from self-interested experts to a committee comprised of members with uncertain
and heterogeneous preferences. This committee design is found to reveal information despite self-
interested experts who possess incentives to manipulate the committee decision; however, expert
recommendations are not fully revealing. Furthermore, committee procedures that facilitate the
development of expert reputations improve information revelation in the context of Robert’s Rules
of Order.
The fifth chapter considers the effect of candidate association with nonprofit charities on in-
dividual campaign contributions. This chapter is motivated by the resource literature in political
science which contends that income largely explains individual political contributions (Brady, Verba,
and Schlozman 1995). Challenging this finding, two hypotheses are proposed that suggest a can-
didate’s association with social organizations can significantly affect campaign contributions. The
first hypothesis proposes that by developing an association with charity organizations, candidates
can increase the likelihood of individual contributions. The second hypothesis posits that the effect
of candidate association on campaign contributions is not uniform across all charities. Survey exper-
iments test these hypotheses when American citizens have low levels of candidate information, and
candidates choose to associate with nonpartisan humanitarian or medical charities. The primary
result is that candidates can use charity organizations to increase campaign contributions, but the
significance of this result varies between charity organizations. Candidate association with a med-
ical charity is found to have a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of contributing, and
3this effect is independent of the amount an individual donates to charity. Alternatively, candidate
association with humanitarian charities is not found to have a significant effect on contributions,
but individuals who make larger charitable donations are more likely to contribute to a candidate
who associates with humanitarian charities.
The sixth and final chapter studies optimal candidate location in a multicandidate, sequential
election. The motivation for this chapter is based in research that finds multicandidate competition
in presidential elections prevents convergence to the median voter (Coleman 1971; Aranson and
Ordeshook 1972). This chapter considers the largely ignored research question of election rules and
institutions that affect winnowing; i.e., the process by which candidates voluntarily exit the race.
The primary hypothesis of this paper is, does the cost to compete in later primaries winnow the
field of candidates? A model of candidate winnowing is developed in the context of a two-round
primary followed by a general election, where after the first primary all candidates must pay a
common, fixed cost or be eliminated from the nomination process. Multiple subgame perfect Nash
equilibria are found to exist where winnowing occurs. Conditions are established for the existence
of a unique equilibrium strategy profile where after the first primary losing candidates exit and
winning candidates remain in the election. Results show that the existence and uniqueness of this
equilibrium is more likely to occur when the primary calendar is front-loaded. Additionally, in a
back-loaded primary calendar the winnowing of only losing candidates is a unique equilibrium when
voters place little salience upon the ideological dimension. Finally, under the assumption candidates
are restricted by their primary platforms, analytic and simulation results show that when winnowing
fails to occur candidate platforms are more extreme.
4The following chapter was written in association with R. Michael Alvarez and Thad Hall. All
authors contributed equally to the following chapter.
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Are Americans Confident Their
Ballots Are Counted?
Are Americans Confident Their Ballots Are
Counted?
R. Michael Alvarez California Institute of Technology
Thad E. Hall University of Utah
Morgan H. Llewellyn California Institute of Technology
Building on the literature that investigates citizen and voter trust in government, we analyze the topic of voter
confidence in the American electoral process. Our data comes from two national telephone surveys where voters
were asked the confidence they have that their vote for president in the 2004 election was recorded as intended. We
present preliminary evidence that suggests confidence in the electoral process affects voter turnout. We then
examine voter responses to determine the overall level of voter confidence and analyze the characteristics that
influence the likelihood a voter is confident that their ballot was recorded accurately. Our analyses indicate
significant differences in the level of voter confidence along both racial and partisan lines. Finally, we find voter
familiarity with the electoral process, opinions about the electoral process in other voting precincts, and both general
opinions about voting technology and the specific technology the voter uses significantly affect the level of voter
confidence.
The issue of trust and confidence in the electoralprocess looms large in the United States in thewake of a recent string of disputed and
contested federal elections, beginning in 2000 with
studies of procedural irregularities, mistakes, and
problems associated with the counting and recount-
ing of ballots in Florida and other states (e.g., Caltech/
MIT Voting Technology Project 2001; Wand et al.
2001). Efforts to reform the electoral system include
passage of the ‘‘Help America Vote Act’’ in 2002 and
the introduction of the ‘‘Voter Confidence and
Increased Accessibility Act’’ in 2005 (HR550). How-
ever, questions persist about the degree of confidence
and trust that American citizens and voters have in
their electoral process, given that problems again
arose in the 2004 presidential election in a number of
states (including the pivotal state of Ohio) and in the
recent 2006 midterm election (especially in Sarasota
County, FL).1 Reflecting the apprehension about how
problems in the American electoral process might
affect confidence and trust in the electoral process,
some prominent policy reports have raised concerns
about declining voter confidence. For example, the
2001 report from a commission chaired by former
Presidents Carter and Ford was titled ‘‘To Assure
Pride and Confidence in the Electoral Process’’
(NCFER 2001) and the report of a subsequent
commission, chaired by President Carter and former
Secretary of State Baker, was itself titled ‘‘Building
Confidence in U.S. Elections’’ (CFER 2005).2
Previous research on governmental trust focuses
on the broad issue of whether or not citizens trust the
government to act in the citizens’ best interest. This
line of research has centered on three distinct
research questions. First, there have been studies that
investigate the origins of trust, or distrust; in other
words, the identification of which citizen attributes
determine whether or not they trust government.
This literature has examined a wide variety of
possible covariates of trust in government and has
generally concluded that trust in government is tied
closely with the political orientations and evaluations
of citizens (Bowler and Donovan 2002; Brewer and
Sigelman 2002; Citrin and Luks 2001; Cook and
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 70, No. 3, July 2008, Pp. 754–766 doi:10.1017/S0022381608080730
! 2008 Southern Political Science Association ISSN 0022-3816
1See, for example, Herron et al. (2006) and Stewart (2006).
2The National Commission on Federal Election Reform Report (Carter-Ford Commission) can be found at http://reformelections.org/
ncfer.asp. The Commission on Federal Election Reform (Carter-Baker Commission) can be found at http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/.
Both last touched April 3, 2008.
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Gronke 2005; Stokes 1962). Additionally, findings by
Abramson (1983), Hetherington (1998), and Brewer
and Sigelman (2002) suggest that social situations
and demographic attributes may influence individual
levels of trust.3
Second, research has examined how trust in
government has varied over time. In particular, this
question has been a focus of research in the United
States. Scholars have examined the apparent decline
in the overall level of American trust in government,
reflected in the American National Election Survey
time series of questions on this topic. Although much
has been written about the decline of trust in govern-
ment, its origins, and the consequences, a common
theme emerges from this research (cf., Citrin 1974;
Miller 1974a, 1974b): changes in trust in government
are related to changes in the political environment
and citizen evaluations of that environment, no
matter what we make of the broader implications
of these changes (Chanley, Randolph, and Rahn 2000;
Cook and Gronke 2005).
Third, research on trust in government has
looked at the consequences of trust or distrust. Here,
the research literature has studied various outcome
variables, testing hypotheses where trust (or distrust)
in government might be consequential for political
behavior and attitudes. These studies include exami-
nations of the connection between government trust
and political engagement, voting behavior, compli-
ance, cooperation, and social capital (see Levi and
Stoker 2000). The results of these studies tend to
support the theory that an individual’s trust in
government does not effect voter turnout decisions
(Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting 2003; Rosenstone and
Hansen 1993). However, Hetherington (1999) finds
that, although trust in government may not effect
turnout decisions, it has a significant effect on voter
choice: voters that distrust their government are
likely to vote against incumbents.
Historically, the literature on trust in government
and on campaigns and elections has taken the trust or
confidence that citizens and voters have in the
electoral process for granted. Here we define trust
in the electoral process as the confidence that voters
have that their ballot is counted as intended. For the
remainder of this article we use the term ‘‘confi-
dence’’ to refer to a voter’s confidence that their
ballot was counted as intended. Researching voter
confidence in the electoral process is distinct from
previous studies on governmental trust since there is
no reason to suspect a priori that individuals who
lack confidence in the electoral system comprise a
subset of those who lack trust in government. For
instance, voters may not possess confidence in the
voting technology used to cast a ballot but trust their
elected officials completely. Alternatively, voters may
believe that the electoral process is fair and accurate
but simultaneously hold the belief that all politicians
are crooks. Research in the area of voter confidence is
relatively new and consists primarily of published
statistics on voter confidence rates.4 Scholarly work
on the topic of voter confidence has largely focused
on problems relating to voting technology within
specific geographic locations (Atkeson and Saunders
2007; Bullock, Hood, and Clark 2005; Magleby,
Monson, and Patterson 2007). We differentiate our
work from these previous works by considering the
confidence of the American voting population in the
electoral process. It is our belief that, in the age of
national news programs and the internet, voter
opinions about confidence may be formed at the
national level. The simple fact that there is so little
academic research on voter confidence provides one
important justification for our work.
Most of the past research on trust has focused on
the generic question of trust in government, though
there have been some studies of trust in specific
democratic institutions, such as trust in Congress or
congressional representatives (Bianco 1994; Fenno
1978; Hetherington 1998) or across a number of
democratic institutions, often studied as a combina-
torial scale (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Cook and Gronke
2005). Although our research has the specificity
associated with some of this newer work that tries
to differentiate trust in government across institu-
tional branches (but which often aggregates across
the institutions), we focus not on democratic insti-
tutions but on the democratic process. Some argue
that it is best to compare opinions about existing
democratic institutions to alternative forms of gov-
ernment, but in the present context we prefer to focus
only on confidence in the existing electoral process
and not hypothetical alternatives.5 Although recent
3The effect of demographic traits upon individual trust is the
subject of some debate as Stokes (1962), Citrin and Lukes (2001),
and Cook and Gronke (2005) find demographic characteristics
have a marginal effect on trust.
4Hasen (2005) provides some statistics on voter confidence in his
work. CNN exit polls report voter confidence rates in 2004 and
2006. MacManus (2003) estimates Florida voter confidence
following the 2002 election. The Winston Group conducted a
survey in April 2004 and reported voter confidence across voting
technology. See http://www.itaa.org/es/release.cfm?ID=577.
5Linz (1988) argues that analyzing the legitimacy of a democratic
government only makes sense when comparing the legitimacy
of a democratic government relative to alternative forms of
government.
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research on eliciting expectations and opinions about
future events is promising (Manski 2004), it still is
difficult to assess the reliability of survey responses to
hypothetical questions.6
Despite the fact that previous research has found
little relationship between trust in government and a
voter’s turnout decision (Citrin 1974; Rosenstone
and Hansen 1993), Hetherington (1999) finds trust
in government may affect vote choice. Similar to
Hetherington, we suspect a voter’s perception of
confidence about past elections may influence voter
behavior. However, we expect voters who lack con-
fidence in the 2004 election to be less likely to vote in
the 2006 election. Thus, an additional motivation for
our work is that we hypothesize voter beliefs about
the questions ‘‘do voters have confidence in the
election process?’’ and ‘‘do voters trust government?’’
may trigger different voter behavior.
To help motivate our research, we begin with a
preliminary analysis of new data collected from a
telephone survey fielded October 26–31, 2006. We
present evidence that supports our hypothesis that
voters who are less confident in past elections are less
likely to vote in future elections. This survey was
conducted by International Communications Re-
search, who administered the questionnaire to ran-
domly selected participants interviewed by telephone.7
We asked 1,084 respondents two questions:
(1) I’d like you to rate the chances that you will vote
in the 2006 elections. Are you absolutely certain
to vote, will you probably vote, are the chances
50-50 or less, or have you already voted?
(2) How confident are you that your ballot in the
November of 2004 presidential contest between
George Bush and John Kerry was counted as you
intended? Would you say you are very confident,
somewhat confident, not too confident, or not at
all confident?
The results in Table 1a are weighted using popula-
tion weights provided by International Communication
Research. Table 1a depicts a clear relationship between
voter confidence about past elections and the likelihood
of voting in future elections; individuals with higher
levels of confidence in their ballot for the 2004 election
are more likely to vote in the 2006 election. In Table1b
we divide respondents into two categories; likely voters,
who respond as either already voted or absolutely
certain of voting, and possible voters, who responded
as being probable or having a chance of 50–50 or less of
voting. Classifying respondents into these two catego-
ries again shows a positive relationship between con-
fidence and the likelihood of voting. Furthermore,
when specifying a regression model with the four
categories of likelihood of voting as the dependent
variable and controlling for variables such as confi-
dence, party identification, education, employment
status, gender, race, and age, the estimated coefficient
for confidence is both positive and significant.8 Tables
1a and 1b are far from a definitive study, but these
tables suggest a strong relationship between voter
confidence and future turnout decisions. We think
the relationship identified above between confidence in
the electoral process and political participation gives
important empirical and normative justifications for
the more detailed research we report below on the
confidence of voters in the electoral process.
The remainder of the analysis reported in this article
investigates the confidence American voters have that
TABLE 1a Correlation between Confidence and Likelihood of Voting
Already Voted Absolutely Certain Will Vote Probably Vote 50-50 or Less
Not at all confident 4% (2) 8% (43) 16% (20) 16% (11)
Not too confident 9% (4) 11% (59) 19% (23) 30% (19)
Somewhat confident 20% (10) 19% (106) 32% (39) 23% (15)
Very confident 68% (34) 62% (340) 33% (41) 31% (20)
Total 100% (50) 100% (548) 100% (123) 100% (65)
6As Manski (2004) points out, much care is needed to design
survey questions to measure expectations and opinions about
hypothetical future events. Working to insure intrapersonal
comparability is difficult, as is insuring that the question itself
allows respondents to reveal the full extent of their uncertainty
about future events. Measuring hypothetical future scenarios in
opinion surveys involves complex survey questions (e.g., Manski
2004) or multiple survey questions (e.g., Alvarez and Franklin
1994), and it is unclear what analytic gain might be produced by
querying voters about their relative confidence in the current
electoral system, relative to ones that the voter may have no
information about or experience with.
7Additional information regarding the survey methodology of
International Communications Research is provided in Appendix
A at http://journalofpolitics.org/.
8See Appendix D at http://journalofpolitics.org for more detail
about the model specification and a table containing the esti-
mated coefficients.
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their presidential vote in the 2004 election was
recorded as intended. We study only voters in this
article for a number of reasons. First, we suspect (and
leave for future research) that voters and nonvoters are
likely to be different in what factors influence percep-
tions of confidence in the electoral process; specifically,
we expect that, for voters, the voting experience, such
as the voting technology used to cast the ballot,
significantly affects confidence. Second, we are inter-
ested in determining the roles of various voting
technologies upon confidence. In many cases we think
nonvoters will be unable to accurately report the
particular voting technology used in their area. Finally,
the dependent variable in our analysis is the con-
fidence the voter has that their ballot for president in
the 2004 election was counted as intended. We leave
for future research the development of appropriate
survey questions that can assess the hypothetical level
of confidence that a nonvoter might have had, were
they to have participated in some past election.
The goal of this article is to test a series of
hypotheses regarding what attributes influence voter
confidence. We hypothesize that those historical at-
tempts such as Jim Crow laws and what some have
alleged as recent attempts to disenfranchise black
voters in Ohio will result in African Americans being
less confident than whites.9 Second, we analyze the
effect of partisanship upon voter confidence. Given the
political environment in which our data was collected
we hypothesize that Republicans are more confident
than Democrats. Third, we investigate how voting
technology affects voter confidence. This question is
particularly timely as today’s electoral environment is
witness to large scale changes in the voting technology
and debate over the introduction of new voting
technologies. Here we hypothesize that voters who
use electronic voting technologies are less confident,
given the negative media coverage of these voting
systems. Fourth, we consider whether knowledge of
events (good or bad) from other voting precincts
affects an individual’s likelihood of confidence; which
we call a contamination effect. More specifically, we
analyze whether voter perceptions of the voting
technologies they do not use affects their confidence.
Given the recent deluge of media attention focusing
upon the difficulties and problems with electronic
ballots, we hypothesize that negative opinions about
electronic ballots affect the confidence of those who do
not use electronic ballots.10 Finally, we are interested
in determining the role familiarity with the voting
process (especially a voter’s level of past participation)
has upon a voter’s likelihood of confidence. We
hypothesize that familiarity breeds confidence; ceteris
paribus individuals who vote more are more likely to
be confident. If confidence influences turnout deci-
sions as we hypothesize above and we show familiarity
leads to increased levels of confidence, then when
considered jointly these two relationships may help
explain why voting is considered by some to be habit
forming (Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003).
Confidence in the Election Process
The analysis reported in the rest of this article is
based on the responses of 2,793 voters gathered in
two separate surveys. Opinions regarding the 2004
presidential election were collected from 1,326 voters
in the first survey (March 9–15, 2005) and 1,467
voters in the second survey (January 18–24, 2006).
Although minor differences exist between the two
survey formats, the questions of interest in these
analyses were consistent. International Communica-
tions Research administered the questionnaire to
randomly selected participants and conducted the
interviews over the telephone.11
TABLE 1b Collapsed Analysis of the Correlation
between Confidence and Likelihood of
Voting
Likely Votera,c Possible Voter,b,c
Not at all confident 8% (45) 16% (31)
Not too confident 11% (63) 22% (42)
Somewhat confident 19% (116) 29% (54)
Very confident 63% (374) 33% (61)
Total 100% (598) 100% (188)
aRespondents who report having voted early or absolutely certain
will vote.
bRespondents who report being probable to vote or reporting a
50% chance or less they will vote.
cProbability the proportion of possible voters who respond as
being not confident is equal to the proportion of likely voters
who respond as being not confident is less than 1% (t 5 5.2).
9Previous research by Bullock, Hood, and Clark (2005) finds
black voters in the state of Georgia are less confident relative to
white voters. As to research that indicates that nonwhites might
have been disproportionately affected by administrative or voting
system problems in recent presidential election cycles, see Sinclair
and Alvarez (2004) and Tomz and Van Houweling (2003).
10For a more systematic analysis of media coverage of the
electronic voting debate, see Hall (2005) and Alvarez and Hall
(2008).
11Additional information regarding the survey methodology of
International Communications Research as well as the weighted
survey marginals is provided in the online appendix.
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The dependent variable of our study is a survey
question asked of voters in order to determine their
level of confidence in their vote being recorded
correctly: ‘‘How confident are you that your ballot
for president in the 2004 election was counted as you
intended?’’ Respondents were asked to select one of
the following options: very confident, somewhat
confident, not too confident, and not at all confident.
We recoded the responses into the variable confidence
where a very confident response takes a value of three,
a somewhat confident response takes a value of two, a
not-too-confident response takes a value of one, and a
not-at-all-confident response takes a value of zero.
We examine the question of voter confidence
using both descriptive and regression analyses. The
table in the next section examines the overall con-
fidence level among white and African American
voters. To isolate the effect of a single socioeconomic
or political attribute upon a voter’s confidence, we
then estimate a multiple logistic regression model
where confidence is an ordinal dependent variable
with very confident responses coded as a three and
not at all confident responses coded as a zero. In
order to facilitate interpretation of the logit coeffi-
cients, a table of first differences is provided.
Confidence in Voting: A Descriptive
Analysis
We present in Table 2 the summary statistics for
confidence of white and African American individu-
als who reported voting in the 2004 election. The
results in Table 2 are weighted using population
weights provided by International Communication
Research.
Table 2 reports approximately 11% of voters in
our sample are either not at all confident or not too
confident that the electoral system counted their
ballots correctly during the 2004 election. This figure
is comparable to the 9% of CNN exit poll respondents
who answered a similar question following the No-
vember 2004 election.12 Extrapolating the results of
our sample to the 123.5 million voters in the 2004
election implies approximately 13 million voters were
not confident their 2004 ballot was counted as
intended.13 Although some may debate the substantive
significance of 11%, the results presented in Table 2
show African Americans appear to be far less confident
in the electoral system. African American voters are
significantly less likely to express either a somewhat
confident or very confident response in the electoral
system as compared to white voters, (t 5 5.8). Given
the preliminary results suggesting a relationship be-
tween confidence and turnout, lower confidence rates
among African American voters relative to whites in
2004 may lead to lower turnout rates among previous
African American voters relative to whites in 2008.
Finally, the large differences between African American
and white voter confidence rates suggest that the
factors which determine voter confidence may vary
substantially depending upon a voter’s race.
Logistic Regression Results
In order to investigate the five primary hypotheses,
we estimate a model using the ordinal measure
confidence as the dependent variable, where higher
values of the dependent variable correspond to a
voter who is more confident that their vote for
President in the 2004 election was counted as
intended. As the dependent variable in this analysis
involves an ordinal choice, we use an ordinal logit
TABLE 2 Confidence of White and African American Voters
Confidence Whitesa African Americansa Total
Not at all confident 3.5% (85) 15.9% (47) 4.8% (132)
Not too confident 5.0% (124) 16.5% (48) 6.3% (172)
Somewhat confident 21.8% (532) 37.3% (110) 23.4% (642)
Very confident 68.7% (1,681) 29.7% (87) 64.5% (1,768)
Don’t Know/Refused 1.0% (24) 0.6% (2) 1.0% (26)
Total 100% (2,446) 100% (294) 100% (2,739)
aIgnoring the don’t know/refused responses, the probability that the proportion of African Americans who respond as being not
confident is equal to the proportion of whites who respond as being not confident is less than 1% (t 5 7.6).
12The CNN 2004 exit poll numbers can be viewed at the
following website: http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/
results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html.
13The total turnout figure was obtained from a website main-
tained by Michael McDonald http://elections.gmu.edu/Voter_
Turnout_2004.htm.
758 r. michael alvarez, thad e. hall and morgan h. llewellyn
10
model to produce estimates for the various inde-
pendent variables. The regression analysis will con-
tinue to focus upon the central questions: (1) Does
race affect the likelihood of confidence, (2) What role
does partisanship have in determining confidence,
(3) How do the various voting technologies affect the
likelihood of voter confidence, (4) Do voter percep-
tions about elections outside their own precinct affect
confidence, that is does a contamination effect exist,
and (5) Is there a corresponding increase in the
likelihood of confidence when a voter’s familiarity
with the electoral process increases?
Before we consider the estimated coefficients, it is
necessary to describe the measures taken to avoid
problems associated with possible heterogeneity be-
tween the two surveys. Using a likelihood ratio test,
we tested for heterogeneity between the two surveys
and reject the hypothesis that there are significant dif-
ferences between the two surveys (x2510 d.f.513).14
Below, we present the estimated models, pooling the
data from both surveys.
We are also concerned about heterogeneity aris-
ing from differences in confidence between white and
African American voters. Prior research in the trust
in government literature identifies minorities as being
less trusting in government than whites (Abramson
1983; Brewer and Sigelman 2002; Michelson 2001). In
addition, evidence suggests nonwhites have been
disproportionately affected by the recent spate of
election difficulties (Alvarez and Hall 2004; Tomz
and Van Houweling 2003). Given these previous
findings and the survey marginals presented in Table
2, we tested for heterogeneity between white and
African American voters in their confidence.
We estimate a logit model pooling across white
and African American voters into a single sample
while controlling for differences between the races
with a single indicator variable. As we show in the
first column of Table 3, the coefficient for race is
negative and significant in the bF model, suggesting
that African American voters are less confident than
white voters, ceteris paribus. We suspect the signifi-
cant difference in confidence rates between the races
is based upon two factors. First, confidence rates may
TABLE 3 Ordinal Logit Coefficient Estimates for Confidence: Combined Data, White Model, African
American Model
African American & White White
Variable bF Standard Error bC Standard Error
Age .14 .04† .14 .04†
Male .40 .09† .41 .10†
log(Education) .66 .09† .70 .10†
Not employed 2.21 .10† 2.24 .11†
City 2.15 .10 2.14 .10
Republican 1.31 .12† 1.35 .13†
Independent .33 .10† .37 .11†
E-voter 2.53 .13† 2.67 .14†
Lever 2.34 .15† 2.41 .15†
Punch card 2.22 .13 2.29 .14†
Absentee 2.60 .15† 2.67 .16†
E-opinion .11 .04† .12 .04†
E-voter opinion .50 .08† .56 .08†
Race 2.95 .16† 2 2
Constant 1 22.49 .23 22.57 .25
Constant 2 21.56 .22 21.60 .24
Constant 3 .22 .21 .22 .23
Observations 2,594 2,403
Full vs. null model x2 test statistica 311 242
aThis is a test of model significance. We present the x2 test statistic when testing if the model presents a significant improvement over
that predicted by a model comprised solely of the intercept terms.
†Indicates significance at 95% level.
14The likelihood ratio test consisted of specifying one model in
which the estimates for the coefficients were obtained from the
pooled data and a second model in which each survey produced
separate estimates for the coefficients. A comparison of the two
log-likelihoods produces a statistically insignificant chi-square
test statistic, allowing us to reject the hypothesis that there are
significant differences between the surveys.
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be affected by the historical differences brought on by
past efforts on the part of white voters to disenfran-
chise African Americans via methods such as Jim
Crowe laws (e.g., Keyssar 2000). Second, a perception
may exist (whether accurate or not) among the
African American and white communities that par-
ticular events surrounding the 2000 and 2004 elec-
tions were an organized effort to discriminate against
African Americans.15
The second step in our analysis of the difference
between white and African American voter confi-
dence was to test for parametric heterogeneity; that is,
is it appropriate for us to pool white and African
American voters into a single sample or do the
available covariates associated with confidence differ
in statistically significant ways for whites and African
Americans? Testing the difference in the likelihood
ratios for a model that accounts for individual race
effects against a nested model without race effects
produces a chi-square test statistic of 28 (13 degrees
of freedom), which is significant at the 99% con-
fidence level. Given this result, the data indicate that
whites and African Americans have different deter-
minants of confidence, and it is appropriate to model
them independently. Unfortunately, in the two sur-
veys we analyze here, we lack sufficient variation
across African American voters (191 observations) to
produce meaningful estimates for an ordered logit
model specific to African American voters.
The difference in confidence and the heteroge-
neity in the data based upon minority status raise
both normative and positive concerns related to
participation. Given the historical disenfranchise-
ment of African American voters, any factor that
reduces the confidence of this group of voters is
troubling since we hypothesize that reducing African
American confidence may reduce African American
turnout. If the electorate believes minority ballots are
not being counted properly, this view may negatively
affect the perceived legitimacy of our elected officials
among all Democrats regardless of race.
We focus the remainder of our results upon the
bC model, which is shown in the second column of
Table 3 (ordinal logistic regression estimates for a
sample constrained to only white voters). This model
fit statistic is highly significant, and the model pro-
duces a set of coefficient estimates that are generally
statistically significant, which in most cases are signed
consistently with our hypothesized expectations.
The logistic regression coefficients from the bC
model were transformed into first differences and are
presented in Table 4, estimated using CLARIFY (King,
Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). The values in Table 4
indicate how a change in a specific attribute will alter
the probability of a white voter being confident,
holding the other attributes at the median response
level.16 The effect of a coefficient in Table 3 can be
observed in Table 4 as a general rightward or leftward
shift in the distribution of the estimated likelihood of
the various confidence levels. A variable with a positive
effect upon confidence will increase the estimated
likelihood a voter is very confident and vice versa for
a variable with a negative effect upon confidence.
A brief example will help to elucidate the table of
first differences. In Table 4, the figures at the top
represent the probability that a hypothetical white
voter who possesses the median sample attributes is
not at all confident, not too confident, somewhat
confident, or very confident that their vote was re-
corded as intended. Suppose we are interested in
comparing the probabilities of confidence for a
typical white Republican voter with a typical white
Democrat voter. In Table 4 we see that a switch from
Democrat to Republican will increase the probability a
white voter is very confident by 24 points; from .63 to
.87. Similarly, changing the voting technology utilized
from paper/optical scan to absentee increases the
estimated probability that a white voter who pos-
sesses the other median characteristics is not too
confident by four points; from .05 to .09.
Citrin (1974) finds that Democrats (Republi-
cans) exhibit higher levels of trust in government
when a Democrat (Republican) holds the presiden-
tial office. Additionally, the Florida recount in 2000
and the electoral difficulties encountered in Ohio
during the 2004 election are examples of election
controversies with strong partisan overtones. Find-
ing Citrin’s result plausible within the context of
confidence and recent experiences at the polls, we
anticipate that, when Republican and Democrat
confidence rates are compared, Republicans will be
more confident.17
15See, for example, ‘‘The Long Shadow of Jim Crow: Voter
Intimidation and Suppression in America Today.’’ A Report by
PFAW Foundation and NAACP http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/gen-
eral/default.aspx?oid516367.
16In some cases such as voter technology the modal response is
used. For a listing of the ‘‘median’’ response values see footnotes
to Table 4. Note, we do not report the significance of the
differences since each of the variables reported in Table 4 was
found to be significant using the ordinal logit model which
generated the first differences.
17We specified a model in which we test for a winner’s effect at
the state level where an individual was considered a winner at the
state level if following the election the governor’s mansion and
state legislature were controlled by the same party. However, we
found no evidence of a winner’s effect at the state level.
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As expected, the bC model ascribes a powerful
effect to political identification on a voter’s likelihood
of confidence. The distribution of the estimated
confidence level shifts right for Republican voters
when compared to Democratic voters. This shift in
the distribution is best seen by the fact that white
Republican voters are 24 points more likely to be very
confident in the electoral process than their Demo-
cratic counterparts. Even independent voters are
estimated to be 8 points more likely to be very
confident in their vote being counted correctly when
compared to Democrats. Similar to past work
(Bowler and Donovan 2002; Citrin 1974), we assume
that Republicans should be more confident due to a
winner’s effect from the 2000 and 2004 elections.
The inquiry into the effect of voting technology
upon a voter’s confidence is appropriate given the
shift away from traditional voting technologies toward
electronic voting machines (Alvarez and Hall 2005,
2008). Yet debate exists regarding the desirability of
this shift toward electronic voting as shown by New
Mexico’s decision to implement a statewide paper
ballot system as a replacement for various electronic
voting technologies used in counties throughout the
state, and by the debates that have occurred in other
states like California, Florida, Maryland and Ohio
about electronic voting machines.
Information regarding the technology used to
cast a ballot was obtained through two questions.
First, voters were asked if they voted at their local
precinct, by absentee ballot, or in early voting. If an
individual responded ‘‘yes’’ to voting by absentee
ballot, then we coded their voting technology as
absentee. Given the small numbers and variety of
voting technologies employed by early voters, Tables
3 and 4 do not provide a measure of the confidence
TABLE 4 First Differences for the White Votersa; Model bC
Not at all
Confident
Not too
Confident
Somewhat
Confident
Very
Confidentc
Median white voter 3.5 5.2 28.3 63.0
Voter characteristics
Male 21 22 26 +9
Not employed +1 +1 +4 26
City +1 +1 +2 24
Republican 23 24 217 +24
Independent 21 21 26 +8
E-voter +3 +4 +9 216
Lever +2 +2 +6 210
Punch card +1 +2 +4 27
Absentee +3 +4 +9 216
E-opinionb 0 21 22 +3
E-voter opinionb 24 25 24 +13
No H.S. Degree +7 +6 +5 218
H.S. Degree +2 +2 +3 27
Some College 2 2 2 2
Vocational School 21 21 23 +5
College Degree 22 22 25 +9
Advanced Degree 22 23 27 +12
Age 18–29 +1 +1 +4 26
Age 30–39 0 +1 +2 23
Age 40–49 2 2 2 2
Age 50–65 0 21 22 +3
Age 66+ 21 21 24 +6
aHolding all responses at the median characteristic: age 40–49, female, some college, paper ballot, does not live in a large city, Democrat,
employed and media effect of 2.14.
bThe first difference for media effect is computed by increasing the median response one unit.
cThe total change in estimated confidence resulting from a change in voter characteristics must sum to zero across the four confidence
categories. As the distribution of voters across the four confidence categories is skewed toward the right (very confident), any change in
voter characteristics which results in a change in confidence is likely to affect the probability of a very confident response differently than
a not at all, not too, or somewhat confident responses.
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level of early voters.18 Individuals who responded
‘‘yes’’ to voting at their local precinct were asked an
additional follow-up question regarding the method
by which they cast their ballot.19 The respondents
who voted at their local precincts were given the
following choices regarding the voting technology
used at their polling site: electronic voting, punch
cards, levers, paper/optical scan, other.
There is one primary conclusion that we wish to
highlight when we evaluate the coefficients and first
differences associated with the voting technology
variables found in Tables 3 and 4. The mode of
voting—precinct-based voting compared to absentee
voting—makes a difference in a voter’s level of
expressed confidence. Under most circumstances
voting by any technology other than a paper ballot
cast in a voting precinct appears to reduce the
confidence of white voters.20 Paper absentee ballots
and precinct-cast electronic ballots appear to have the
largest negative effect on confidence; precinct-cast
lever and punch card technologies exert a smaller yet
still significant negative effect upon confidence. The
estimated signs for the voting technology coefficients
found in Table 4 appear reasonable when compared
to results obtained from a study conducted by The
Winston Group in April 2004. The Winston Group
did not find a significant difference in confidence
rates between lever and paper voters but found that
punch card and electronic voters were less confident
relative to those individuals who vote via paper
ballot.21
A current trend among state election officials is
to relax the conditions under which one can obtain
an absentee ballot. During the 2004 election 26 states
did not place geographic or immobility restrictions
upon the ability of voters to cast absentee ballots.
This trend is based upon the belief that all-mail
voting systems, such as that employed in Oregon,
increase voter turnout (Alvarez and Hall 2004;
Burchett and Southwell 2000). Given the effect of
the coefficient absentee on a voter’s confidence and
the hypothesized relationship between confidence
and turnout, it is unclear in elections which experi-
ence traditionally high turnout that a switch to all-
mail voting systems will increase voter turnout.22
Though it is possible that voters may view all-mail
voting systems as distinct from an absentee ballot, we
think the negative and significant coefficient for
absentee requires additional study into voter confi-
dence in all-mail voting systems.23
Given the current nationwide trend to shift away
from traditional voting technologies and towards elec-
tronic precinct-based voting, one of the more interest-
ing results found in the bC model is the negative
coefficient of electronic precinct voting on confidence.
There are three possible sources of voter skepticism
concerning electronic precinct voting: (1) Voters are
undergoing a transition period in which they need to
become familiar with the operation and security
features of the new voting technology; (2) Voters
simply do not trust the ‘‘black box’’ nature of electronic
voting and cannot be convinced that electronic precinct
voting is as accurate and provides similar levels of
protection against fraud relative to paper ballots; or (3)
Voters have seen or heard media reports regarding the
controversy about electronic precinct voting and may
be concerned about the susceptibility of electronic
voting machines to failure or fraud.
Additional research is needed in order to determine
whether the negative estimate for the e-voter coefficient
is a transitory effect brought on by the media and/or
implementation of a new voting technology or what
voters view as a fundamental deficiency associated
with electronic precinct voting.24 If voters persistently
view electronic precinct voting as inferior in some
aspect to paper precinct ballots, then election officials
may have little choice but to slow the transition to
electronic precinct voting. However, if the negative
coefficient for e-voter is simply the reflection of a
transition period of voters becoming adjusted to a new
voting technology, then perhaps election officials
should conduct education campaigns focusing upon
the operation, security, and accuracy of the electronic
precinct voting technologies.
After the 2000 election many punch card voters
may have reduced the confidence they placed in the
18Additionally, we exclude individuals who responded voting by
‘‘other’’ method; this category contained nine respondents.
19This question was not asked of absentee or early voters.
20We show later that a significant difference in confidence does
not exist between individuals who cast a paper ballot and those
individuals who cast an electronic ballot while holding positive
opinions about e-voting.
21Marginals taken from a press release by the Information
Technology Association of America. The paper can be found at
http://www.itaa.org/es/release.cfm?ID5577.
22There is a literature suggesting that all-mail voting does not
increase turnout (Jacoby 1996; Ornstein 1996).
23Our sample has too few respondents from the state of Oregon
to perform a meaningful analysis of this question.
24Eliminating the control variable for media bias and rerunning
the model produces a negative and statistically significant
estimate for the e-voter coefficient. However, the estimated
change in likelihood of confidence for a white voter is reduced
to a negative five points when evaluating the effect of casting an
electronic ballot versus a paper ballot.
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punch card ballot because of the postelection focus
upon hanging chads. Thus, we find it reasonable that
voters associate a lower degree of confidence with the
punch card technology relative to paper ballots. In
response to the 2000 election, government officials
sped up the retirement of punch card voting systems,
replacing them in many voting districts with elec-
tronic voting technology (Alvarez and Hall 2005).
Unfortunately, our results show that in the short run
this move from punch card to electronic ballots may
not have improved voter confidence; at least among
white voters.
We develop the variables e-opinion and e-voter
opinion to evaluate how events outside a voter’s own
personal voting experience affect their likelihood of
confidence; we call this a contamination effect. We
use voter opinion about electronic voting as a proxy
for evaluating the effect of outside events upon
confidence since less than a quarter of respondents
voted electronically. We think the large amount of
media attention upon electronic voting before and
after the 2004 election allowed most voters to form
perceptions about electronic voting. If the variable
e-opinion significantly affects a voter’s likelihood of
confidence, then we think this is evidence which
suggests voter confidence may be affected by events
that occur outside the voter’s own poll experience.
We estimate the variables e-opinion and e-voter
opinion from the responses to four questions which
seek voter opinion about electronic voting. We asked
respondents four questions focusing on voter beliefs
about the ease of fraud, level of accuracy, potential
for machine failure, and advantages to the disabled
associated with electronic voting.25 Performing a
factor analysis of the four electronic voting questions,
we identify one principal component and use those
results to produce a factor score to summarize each
voter’s opinions about electronic voting. We include
this variable on the right-hand side of our logit model
under the variable name e-opinion: this variable takes
a value from 22.75 to 2.3 where a negative value
implies less approval or comfort in electronic voting
and a positive value implies greater approval or
comfort with electronic voting. We also include a
variable we call e-voter opinion, which interacts the
variable e-opinion by the binary e-voter variable
(e-voter opinion is zero for non-e-voters).26 The
interaction variable e-voter opinion is included to
control for the possibility that beliefs about electronic
voting may have a different effect on confidence for
those who use electronic voting devices.
The significance of the estimated coefficient on
e-opinion implies a voter’s negative assessment of
events in other voting precincts negatively affect a
voter’s confidence. A white voter who does not cast
an electronic ballot but has a negative opinion about
e-voting, e-opinion5 22, is about 11 points less likely
to be very confident relative to a white voter with a
positive opinion about e-voting, e-opinion 5 2. Thus,
we identify what we think is a contamination effect
on voter confidence: voters who are less confident
about the election process outside of their own voting
precinct will also be less likely to be confident in their
own voting precinct. As expected, individuals who
vote using electronic ballots and hold negative
opinions about electronic voting are ceteris paribus
less likely to be confident than non-e-voters. How-
ever, we note that the confidence rates of e-voters
who have positive opinions regarding electronic vot-
ing are equivalent to that of paper voters with neutral
opinions regarding electronic voting. We think that
the finding of a contamination effect allows for the
possibility that the media may influence voter con-
fidence: analysis of the media’s influence upon voter
confidence is one interesting question to be studied in
future research (e.g., Alvarez and Hall 2008).
The final hypothesis we test is whether a voter’s
familiarity or degree of past participation with the
electoral system affects the likelihood of confidence.
We suspect voter familiarity with the voting process
is an important determinant of voter confidence and
expect a positive relationship between voter confi-
dence and familiarity. Although we did not directly
ask respondents questions regarding familiarity with
the voting system, we follow the literature on turnout
and use education and age as proxies for voter
familiarity with the electoral system. Campbell et al.
(1960), Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), and Blais
and Dobrzynska (1998) find higher levels of educa-
tion coincide with higher voting rates, and thus
through higher turnout rates, highly educated indi-
viduals should have greater familiarity with the
electoral process. Similarly, research by Wolfinger
and Rosenstone (1980), Miller and Shanks (1996),
and Matsusaka and Palda (1999) suggest a positive
relationship between age and the likelihood of voting.
Additionally, older voters are more likely to possess
greater familiarity with the electoral process by the
mere fact that older voters have had more oppor-
tunities for interaction with the voting process than
25The precise questions asked of the respondents can be found in
the Appendix.
26The variable e-voters opinion appears to be an adequate control
for e-opinion since if we drop e-voters from the bC model then
our estimate on e-opinion does not change.
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younger voters. We test for the effect of familiarity on
a voter’s confidence by estimating the effects of age
and education upon a voter’s likelihood of confi-
dence. If familiarity with the electoral process has an
effect upon voter confidence, we would expect
estimated coefficients for education and age to be
both positive and significant in the bC model.
Respondents’ education was classified into six
different levels, as seen in Table 4, and these levels
were assigned values 1–6 (with 6 representing an
advanced degree) with the log of these values used to
compute the log of education variable. Table 4
reports how the likelihood of confidence changes
with each additional level of educational achieve-
ment, holding all other responses at the median level.
The effect of education on a white voter’s confidence
is positive and statistically significant.
In our regression analysis the variable age con-
tains five age categories with age taking values 1–5
where 1 identifies a voter aged 18–29 and 5 a voter
aged 66 and older. We note that the estimate for the
age coefficient is both positive and significant in the
bA model. Additionally, Table 4 shows that older
white voters appear more confident than younger
white voters. However, there is the possibility that,
relative to younger individuals, older individuals may
be less likely to vote if they lack confidence in the
electoral process. Thus, it is possible the positive
affect we attribute to age is really a result of self-
selection. We think that the magnitude and signifi-
cance of the estimated coefficients for age and
education are large enough to be robust even with
minor self-selection problems. Thus, we conclude
that voter familiarity with the electoral system ap-
pears to have a positive affect upon voter confidence.
The potential for self-selection highlighted in this
section shows the need for additional research that
investigates how behavior may vary across groups in
the presence of low confidence.
Conclusions
How confident voters are that their ballots are
counted correctly is a normative issue within a
representative democracy as a lack of confidence
threatens the perceived legitimacy of an elected
government. Furthermore, we believe the issue of
voter confidence is not only normative, and we
present data supporting the hypothesis that voter
confidence has a significant effect upon political
participation. Specifically, we find a positive relation-
ship between voter turnout and confidence; more
confident voters are more likely to turnout to vote.
Although we leave greater investigation of this topic
to future research, we think that the study of the
relationship between voter confidence and political
participation may provide a better understanding of
voter behavior in representative democracy.
Our analyses indicate that a significant difference
in confidence exists along racial lines, as the propor-
tion of the African American voters who are con-
fident that their vote for President in the 2004
election was counted as intended is significantly
lower than the proportion of white voters who are
similarly confident. One-third of African American
respondents reported a lack of confidence in the
electoral system but less than 10% of white respond-
ents reported a lack of confidence in the electoral
system. When combined with our results regarding
political participation, our analysis showing that
African Americans are significantly less confident
than whites raises serious normative concerns regard-
ing the representation of the African American
community in the American democratic process.
We conclude that both political affiliation and
voter familiarity with the electoral process, as meas-
ured by education and age, exert a significant
influence upon confidence. We think that white
Republicans are more confident than white Demo-
crats due to a winner’s effect stemming from the 2000
and 2004 national elections. We find that increased
levels of voter familiarity result in a higher likelihood
of confidence, which pending additional research on
confidence and voter turnout may give justification
to the argument that voting is habit forming (e.g.,
Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003). Although most of
the coefficients on the demographic variables in our
model have signs similar to those found in studies on
trust in government, our research differs from past
research on trust in government, as we find a strong
and direct relationship between party identification
and voter confidence.
We find that the probability of a voter being
confident is significantly affected by the voting
technology; with white voters who cast their ballot
via a paper precinct technology being more likely to
be confident than white voters who cast their ballot
via punch card, lever, or electronic precinct voting
technologies. We present additional evidence sup-
porting the conclusion that the confidence rate
among white voters using absentee ballots is signifi-
cantly lower when compared to a paper/optical scan
ballot technology. One very productive avenue of
future research will be to look more specifically at
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individual voting technologies, and to study whether
different types of electronic precinct voting technol-
ogies, for example, may produce a voting experience
that leads to greater voter satisfaction and confidence
than other precinct voting systems.27
Because there is little extant research on the
confidence of voters and citizens in the American
electoral process, we see four major questions need-
ing additional research and a host of additional
questions that can be evaluated while investigating
the big four. First, does a relationship exist between a
voter’s confidence in the electoral process and their
likelihood of voting? Second, what are the character-
istics that influence the confidence of nonvoters, and
are nonvoters less confident than voters? Third, what
are the key attributes of confidence for minorities?
Fourth, among all eligible voters lacking confidence
in the voting system, does their likelihood of partic-
ipation in the electoral process vary by race, party
identification, or age? When do voters appraise their
confidence in the electoral process and how do the
media effect this appraisal? Finally, do voters cast a
ballot believing it will not be counted as intended or
do voters develop this opinion after election results
are observed? Only after we have better understood
the confidence of voters and citizens in the electoral
process, can we assess the affect of recent events—and
recent reform efforts—on the perceptions and be-
havior of Americans.
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Chapter 3
The Winner’s Effect: Post-Election
Voter Confidence Levels
3.1 Motivation
There has been a common assumption permeating conversations in recent election cycles about
the conduct of elections in the United States—that voters lack confidence in the process. The
confidence of voters in the election process is seen as an important indicator of the quality of election
administration, as well as a critical normative issue that may influence the basic legitimacy of the
democratic process in the United States. But while this is a common assumption, the few studies
that have been done so far on this topic have typically found that in recent election cycles most
Americans and American voters are confident in the process (Alvarez and Hall 2004, 2008; Hasen
2005; Atkeson and Saunders 2007; Bullock, Hood and Clark 2005; Hall, Monson, and Patterson
2007, 2008; Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn 2007, 2008). But these studies have all found that there are
important factors that help us understand how confidence varies across voters; such as partisanship,
race, and ethnicity, and how a voter interacts with election officials and pollworkers.
Typically past studies of voter confidence generally agree on two findings. First, voters who
self-identify as Republicans are more confident that their vote was counted accurately relative to
voters who self-identify as independents or Democrats (Alvarez and Hall 2008; Alvarez, Hall, and
Llewellyn 2007, 2008; Atkeson and Saunders 2007; Bullock, Hood and Clark 2005; Hall, Monson, and
Patterson 2007; Magelby, Monson, and Patterson 2007). Second, voters who cast an electronic ballot
are less confident relative to voters who cast a paper ballot (Atkeson and Saunders 2007; Alvarez,
Hall, and Llewellyn 2008). In the context of the 2004 election, these findings are appropriate given
concern raised by minority and civil rights groups regarding the counting of Democratic precincts
in Ohio and media coverage of problems associated with nonverifiable voting technologies in parts
of California and Ohio during the 2004 primaries and general election (e.g., Alvarez and Hall 2008).
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In this paper we study the 2006 mid-term election, because it provides two new contexts in which
to evaluate voter confidence. For the first time since academics began studying voter confidence, in
2006 the Democrats achieved widespread national success by capturing control of the U.S. House
and Senate. Second, following the 2004 election many election officials installed voter verified paper
audit trail (VVPAT) devices on electronic voting machines to enhance the ability to conduct post-
election audits.1 Thus, the 2004 election allows us to differentiate between electronic voting without a
VVPAT device and electronic voting with a VVPAT device. We hypothesize that voter confidence is
dynamic and that the context of an election or voting method affects voter perceptions of confidence.
Thus, we argue voter confidence can only be fully understood in light of the issues surrounding the
election, such as recent changes in election administration or the election outcome.
In the context of political efficacy and general perceptions of the political system, previous
research finds that voters who cast their ballot for the winning candidate tend to have higher levels
of efficacy relative to voters who supported the losing candidate (Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978;
Clarke and Acock 1989; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Anderson and
LoTempio 2002; Banducci and Karp 2003).2 We hypothesize that a similar relationship exists for
how confident voters are in the election process, where individuals who vote for winning candidates
are more confident relative to individuals who vote for losing candidates. At the party level, support
for our hypothesis comes from Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn (2008), who summarize their findings by
hypothesizing that partisan differences in voter confidence may be due to the outcomes of the 2000
and 2004 elections. The first hypothesis that we test is that a winner’s effect exists. A winner’s effect
exists if, following an election, voters who voted for the winning candidate are more confident that
their ballot was counted correctly relative to voters who voted for the losing candidate.3 We test
this hypothesis by analyzing post-election survey data and panel data from two surveys of voters
conducted before and after the 2006 general election. We investigate the existence of a winner’s
effect by controlling for individual vote choice and election results at the house district and state
levels.
Theoretical hypotheses that confidence affects political action date back to the mid-20th century
(Stokes 1962). In the context of political efficacy, empirical evidence suggesting a negative relation-
ship between voter perceptions of confidence and turnout have been found by Rosenstone and Hansen
(1993), and in the specific context of voter confidence by Alvarez, et al. (2008). Due to the nature
1See Alvarez and Hall (2008) and Herrnson et al. (2008a, 2008b) for a discussion of this issue.
2Prior to the 2000 election the political efficacy literature investigated broad questions such as the erosion of
political efficacy during the last half of the 20th century (Dalton 2004) and the comparison of trust in government
across regimes and countries (Inglehart 1997). More specific inquires into questions surrounding political efficacy focus
upon voter trust in particular democratic institutions such as elected officials and Congress (Fenno 1978; Hetherington
1998). However, the literature on trust in government takes the confidence that citizens and voters have in the electoral
process for granted. The distinction between the trust in government literature and studies investigating the confidence
voters and citizens have in the electoral process is important, as a priori there is no reason to suspect that one group
is a subset of the other.
3Our hypothesis that a winner’s effect exists is compatible with voter behavior where ex post voters may rationalize
their vote choice and turnout decision by updating their beliefs over the accuracy of the electoral system.
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of American elections, the potential for a winner’s effect based on voter perceptions of confidence is
particularly troubling. High-profile, two-candidate elections in the United States always contain a
winning and losing candidate, where the losing candidate is excluded from government. If election
results affect voter confidence, then voters who support the losing candidate may be more likely to
question the process used to elect officials, the legitimacy of the elected government, or be less likely
to participate in future elections.4 For instance, some voters in the United States perceived the
Bush Administration as illegitimate following the 2000 and 2004 elections (Craig, Niemi, and Silver
2006). Given America’s penchant for plurality voting, if a winner’s effect exists, then regardless of
the measures taken by election administrators, a group of voters may always exist who question the
accuracy of the election process and the legitimacy of certain politicians.
Through specific challenges to the accuracy and reliability of a voting device, voter perceptions
of an election’s legitimacy may be challenged through voting technology (Saltman 2006). Following
the 2004 election, in response to voting rights groups’ concerns over the accuracy of the voting
process, 18 states passed legislation requiring a verifiable paper audit trail. For precincts using
an electronic voting technology, this legislation requires that a VVPAT device be attached to the
voting technology. The second hypothesis analyzed is that legislation leading to a greater number of
VVPAT devices will produce observable differences in the confidence rates of those electronic voters
who have access to VVPAT devices and those who do not. Although a 2006 survey of voters in
Franklin County, Ohio did not find that the presence of a VVPAT device significantly altered voter
confidence (Magelby et al. 2007), we anticipate that, when analyzing a national sample, the presence
of a VVPAT will increase voter confidence because the voter can know that a durable, independent
record of their vote exists. Although Atkeson and Saunders (2007) find that voting devices that
produce a paper trail lead to greater voter confidence, we differentiate our work by focusing on the
effect of independent recording on the confidence of electronic voters.5
Furthermore, the second hypothesis addresses a debate within the election administration com-
munity over what is the “best” voting technology: paper or electronic voting technologies. Following
the 2000 election, government officials largely agreed that certain voting technologies needed replace-
ment. The newly created Election Assistance Commission (EAC) was charged by the Help America
Vote Act (HAVA) with the task to “establish a program to provide funds to States to replace punch
card voting systems” However, when the EAC was created, officials did not unanimously agree on
the voting technology that should replace punch cards. The debate over the replacement technology
has settled upon two choices: a paper-based ballot such as an optical scan ballot or an electronic
ballot. Proponents of the paper-based technology lauded the fact that paper ballots facilitate re-
4See Nadeau and Blais (1993) for a similar argument, as well as a summary of the normative democratic theory
questions raised by possible winner’s effects.
5For a comprehensive analysis of the features of various voting technologies and the operations of VVPAT systems,
see Herrnson et al. ( 2008).
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counts and audits but proponents of the electronic ballot touted its superior efficiency, control over
the ballot box, and advantages for disabled voters (Alvarez and Hall 2008). To date, the debate
over paper versus electronic ballots continues and is evidenced by Georgia being the first state to
move to all-electronic voting in 2002 and New Mexico’s decision to move away from electronic bal-
lots to statewide optical scan balloting in 2006 (Atkeson, Alvarez, and Hall 2007). Although the
evidence from Franklin County, Ohio, during the 2004 Presidential election suggests the need to
consider the administrative impact of electronic voting (Highton 2006), we limit our discussion to
the consideration of technological effects on voter confidence in the electoral process.
3.2 Confidence in the Election Process
The data analyzed in this article comes from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
(CCES), a collaborative research effort with 39 universities and over 100 political scientists partic-
ipating.6 The 2006 CCES was a national stratified sample survey of registered and unregistered
adults with a sample size of approximately 40,000; registered voters were over-sampled in order to
produce similar rates of voting and nonvoting participants. In order to attain a nationally represen-
tative sample, a random subsample was first selected from the 2004 American Community Study
(ACS). Each individual selected out of the ACS was then matched to an individual who completed
the CCES survey via matching on socio-economic attributes such as gender, age, race, and education.
Finally, CCES respondents were weighted using post-stratification weights in order to equilibrate
the CCES marginal distribution and ACS marginal distribution along a number of socio-economic
variables (education, race, and age, etc.).
Each CCES survey was comprised of approximately 120 questions where questions common
to all participants comprised half of the questionnaire and the other half consisted of questions
designed by individual groups and asked of a subset of 1,000 people. The survey had a pre- and
post-election design where questionnaires were completed on-line and fielded by the survey research
firm Polimetrix, Inc. Pre-election surveys were conducted in October 2006 and the post-election
surveys were completed in November 2006. The results presented here are based on a subsample of
CCES participants who were asked questions over their level of confidence in the election process.
The panel survey contains pre- and post-election opinions for 611 respondents who self-identified
as voting in the 2006 mid-term election and self-identified that they voted using a paper, lever, or
electronic voting technology.
Since voter confidence about the 2006 election is our dependent variable, the wording of the voter
confidence question differed between the pre- and post-election surveys. The dependent variable for
6A complete discussion of the survey methodology can be found at the Cooperative Congressional Election Study
at http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl/cces/index.html. See Gartner (2008) for another example of use of the CCES
data.
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the pre-election survey is, “How confident are you that your vote in the November 2006 election will
be counted as you intended?” Respondents were asked to select one of the following options: very
confident, somewhat confident, not too confident, and not at all confident. For the post-election
survey, the dependent variable is, “How confident are you that your ballot in the November of
2006 election was counted as you intended?” and again the response options were very confident,
somewhat confident, not too confident, and not at all confident. We recoded the responses from the
pre- and post-election surveys into the variables pre-confidence and post-confidence, where a very
confident response takes a value of three, a somewhat confident response takes a value of two, a not
too confident response takes a value of one, and a not at all confident response takes a value of zero.
Below, we examine the question of voter confidence using both a descriptive and regression
methodology. The figures in the next section examine the overall voter confidence level during the
pre- and post-election surveys. We anticipate that a winner’s effect may exist at the house district,
state, and national levels. Specifically, we expect voters who either voted for a winning candidate,
or identify with the winning party at the national level, to experience greater gains in confidence
following the 2006 election. If the presence of a VVPAT device leads to higher voter confidence
among electronic voters, then we expect to observe a difference in the confidence rates between
the two groups of electronic voters. Following the descriptive analysis, we discuss the methodology
and estimates for a series of multivariate logistic regression models that further investigate the two
primary hypotheses.
3.3 Descriptive Analysis
We present in Table 3.1 the weighted summary statistics for voter confidence from the pre-and
post-election surveys. In the October 2006 survey, prior to the election, 17.1% of respondents were
either not at all confident or not too confident that their 2006 ballot would be counted as intended.
Following the 2006 election, in the post-election survey, the percent of respondents who were either
not at all confident or not too confident fell to 9.2%, a difference of about 8 points relative to the
pre-election survey (t=5.4). The 2006 post-election results are comparable to previous nationally
representative polls by Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn (2008) and CNN that, respectively, find 11%
and 9% of voters were not at all or not too confident that their vote for President following the 2004
election were counted as intended.7
By comparing a voter’s confidence rate before and after the election, we can determine whether a
voter’s confidence level was higher, lower, or unchanged following the election. We present in Table
3.2 marginal statistics for changes in voter confidence between the pre-election and post-election
surveys. Relative to their pre-election confidence level, approximately one-third of voters were more
7The CNN 2004 exit poll numbers can be viewed at the following website:
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html.
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Table 3.1: Voter Confidence Summary Statistics
Confidence Pre-election Post-election 
 Not at all confident 5.3% (41) 3.0% (24) 
 Not too confident 11.8% (91) 6.2% (49) 
 Somewhat confident 45.1% (350) 37.7% (296) 
 Very confident 37.8% (293) 53.1% (417) 
Totals 100% (775) 100% (786) 
 
confident following the election, while about 10% of voters are less confident following the election.
Finally, more than one-half of voters reported no change in their confidence level following the 2006
election. Summarizing the results presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the confidence level following the
2006 election is higher relative to the pre-election confidence level.8
Table 3.2: Voter Confidence by Pre- and Post-Election
Confidence  
Less confident following the election 9.7% (60) 
No change in confidence 59.2% (362) 
More confident following the election 31.0% (189) 
Totals 100% (611) 
 
Consistent with the winner’s effect hypothesis, the increase in voter confidence following the 2006
election may reflect increased confidence among voters who cast their ballot for winning candidates.
However, another explanation for the higher levels of confidence following the 2006 election is that
the factors that influence a voter’s assessment of confidence may differ depending upon when the
survey is fielded. For instance, prior to the election a voter’s socio-economic characteristics, such
as party identification or education, may heavily influence voter confidence. Following the election,
specific factors regarding the voting process, such as election outcome or the voting technology used,
may largely determine voter confidence. We turn now to a descriptive analysis of how the specific
context surrounding the voting process may affect voter confidence.
The winner’s effect hypothesizes that individuals who vote for winning candidates are more likely
to be confident that their vote was counted accurately. Table 3.3 presents post-election confidence
levels for individuals who voted in both a house and gubernatorial race. In general, the results
presented in Table 3.3 suggest that confidence rates increase as voters report voting for a greater
8The total number of respondents included in Table 3.1 is higher relative to Table 3.2 some respondents who
participated in the pre-election survey either declined to participate in the post-election survey or were unable to be
contacted.
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number of winning candidates. For instance, voters who reported voting for neither the winning
house nor gubernatorial candidate are 20 points less likely to report being very confident relative
to voters who reported voting for both the winning house and gubernatorial candidates (t=4.8).
Although we will revisit this in the regression analysis, descriptive results lend preliminary support
to the winner’s effect hypothesis.
Table 3.3: Voter Confidence by Election Results
Confidence Both candidates lost 
One candidate won and 
the other lost Both candidates won 
 Not at all confident 11.9% (13) 2.9% (6) 0.0% (0) 
 Not too confident 7.0% (8) 6.9% (14) 5.0% (10) 
 Somewhat confident 40.6% (45) 35.1% (73) 33.9% (67) 
 Very confident 40.5% (45) 55.1% (114) 61.1% (120) 
Totals 100% (111) 100% (207) 100% (197) 
 
In addition to individual races, we hypothesize that a winner’s effect may exist at the state or
federal level as a result of partisan identification. Voters not only identify with candidates from their
own district but, via their party identification, with candidates from different districts and states.
If voters follow races outside of their own district, then voters may be susceptible to inferring local
irregularities from national results. An analysis of reported confidence rates by party ID reveals a
sharp increase in Democratic voter confidence following the 2006 election. Table 3.4 presents pre-
and post-election voter confidence rates for Republicans and Democrats.
Table 3.4: Voter Confidence by Party Identification
Confidence Pre-election Post-election 
   
Democrats   
 Not at all confident 7.0% (19) 2.2% (6) 
 Not too confident 16.6% (44) 8.7% (22) 
 Somewhat confident 54.7% (147) 42.7% (111) 
 Very confident 21.7% (58) 46.4% (120) 
Totals 100%  (268) 100% (259) 
   
Republican   
 Not at all confident 0.3% (1) 0.7% (2) 
 Not too confident 4.3% (10) 4.2% (10) 
 Somewhat confident 35.6% (84) 28.5% (69) 
 Very confident 59.8% (140) 66.6% (162) 
Totals 100% (235) 100% (243) 
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At the national level, the winner’s effect hypothesis predicts that, prior to the 2006 election,
Republicans will be more confident relative to Democrats given Republican electoral successes from
2000 to 2004. However, following the 2006 mid-term election, in which the Democrats retook the
U.S. House and Senate, Democratic voters should experience an increase in confidence relative
to Republicans. As expected, prior to the 2006 election Republicans appear significantly more
confident relative to Democratic voters. Although Republicans are still more confident following
the 2006 election, the confidence gap between Republicans and Democrats is noticeably smaller.
Democratic voter confidence significantly increases following the 2006 election; for instance, the
percent of Democrats who are very confident increases by over 20 points (t=6.1). However, post-
election Republican voter confidence rates are statistically identical when compared to their pre-
election confidence rates (t=1.6).
At the individual voter level, when analyzing changes in confidence between pre-election and
post-election confidence rates, Table 3.5 depicts distinct differences between Democrat and Repub-
lican voters. Republicans are equally likely to become more confident following the election as they
are to become less confident following the election; that is changes in Republican confidence are ap-
proximately normally distributed. Relative to Republican voters, following the election Democratic
voters are more than twice as likely to report a higher level of confidence and about half as likely to
report a drop in confidence.
Table 3.5: Dynamic View of Confidence by Party Identification
Democratic Voter Confidence Democrats Republicans 
Less confident following the election 7.2% (16) 13.8% (26) 
No change in confidence 49.5% (107) 70.2% (134) 
More confident following the election 43.3% (94) 16.1% (31) 
Totals 100% (217) 100% (191) 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that electronic voters who have access to a VVPAT device will have higher
confidence rates relative to electronic voters who do not have access to a VVPAT device. Presented
in Table 3.6 are the post-election confidence rates for voters who used one of three voting tech-
nologies: electronic voting machines with a VVPAT technology, electronic voting without a VVPAT
technology, and paper-based voting.
The descriptive results for confidence, reported by voting technology, indicate that individuals
who vote electronically but have access to a VVPAT are significantly more likely to be somewhat or
very confident relative to electronic voters who do not have access to a VVPAT (t=3.5). Furthermore,
no voter who casts a ballot using an electronic voting machine equipped with a VVPAT described
herself as “not at all confident”. Additionally, VVPAT voters were 12 points more likely to be
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Table 3.6: Voter Confidence by Voting Technology
Confidence Post-election 
  
Electronic with VVPAT  
 Not at all confident 0.0% (0) 
 Not too confident 3.4% (3) 
 Somewhat confident 29.9% (30) 
 Very confident 66.7% (67) 
Totals 100% (90) 
  
Electronic without VVPAT  
 Not at all confident 5.6% (13) 
 Not too confident 8.5% (20) 
 Somewhat confident 39.9% (95) 
 Very confident 46.0% (109) 
Totals 100% (237) 
  
Paper  
 Not at all confident 2.5% (10) 
 Not too confident 6.3% (25) 
 Somewhat confident 36.5% (145) 
 Very confident 54.7% (217) 
Totals 100% (397) 
 
very confident compared to paper ballot voters and 20 points more confident than electronic voters
without a VVPAT. However, we argue that a statistical test of the claim that the VVPAT increases
confidence among electronic voters is meaningful only when done in the context of regression analysis
that controls for other variables such as age and education of the voter. The basis for this claim is
that VVPAT devices may be more common in wealthier voting precincts, which would be positively
correlated with education; we account for this type of correlation in the next section.
3.4 Multivariate Analysis
We use a multivariate analysis to analyze the two hypotheses: (1) that a winner’s effect exists and
(2) the presence of a VVPAT device increases confidence among electronic voters. We estimate two
regression models to investigate these two hypotheses, controlling for a set of independent variables,
and in order to evaluate two separate effects of our hypothesis. The first regression model, Model 1,
uses post-election confidence as the dependent variable to analyze: (1) a winner’s effect exists and
(2) if post election confidence rates are significantly affected by the presence of a VVPAT device.
As the dependent variable in the first model involves an ordinal choice, we estimate an ordinal
choice logit model. In Model 1, the dependent variable has four categories, with the value of three
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corresponding to a voter who is very confident and a value of zero corresponding with a voter who
is not at all confident; thus higher values of the dependent variable translate into higher levels of
confidence.
In Model 2, we estimate a dynamic model of voter confidence that measures changes in individual
voter confidence between the pre-and post-election surveys. As discussed in the descriptive results
section, overall voter confidence increases between the pre- and post-election surveys. The dynamic
model, Model 2, is used to evaluate whether the winner’s effect or voting technology is partially re-
sponsible for this increase in confidence. Furthermore, as we will discuss below, Model 1 is incapable
of identifying a winner’s effect at the national (party) level. However, under some fairly benign as-
sumptions, Model 2 will allow us to estimate whether the winner’s effect exists at the national level.
In Model 2, we analyze changes in voter confidence between the pre- and post-election surveys and
condense the response space from seven possible changes down to three.9 The dependent variable in
Model 2 takes a value of 1 if the voter expressed a higher degree of confidence in the post-election
survey relative to the pre-election survey, a value of -1 if the pre-election confidence level was higher,
and 0 if no change between the surveys.
Testing the winner’s effect hypothesis is complicated by the possibility that a winner’s effect may
simultaneously exist over multiple races on the same ballot. What is more, a voter’s confidence may
be influenced by races in other districts or states. If a winner’s effect exists in multiple races or across
ballots, this implies fairly sophisticated behavior on the part of voters as they differentiate results
from multiple levels of government in their assessment of confidence. In order to evaluate possible
levels to the winner’s effect, we control for election results at the national, state, and house-district
levels. Allowing for the possibility that a Republican voter may favor a Democratic governor or vice
versa, we use three different questions to proxy the winner’s effects at the house-district, state, and
national levels.
In Models 1 & 2, the dummy variables governor win and house win take values of 1 if the
respondent reported voting for the winning gubernatorial or house candidate. Additionally, the
dummy variables governor neutral and house neutral take values of 1 if the respondent did not
vote in that particular race.10 If the values of governor win and governor neutral both equal zero,
then the respondent reported voting for the losing gubernatorial candidate in 2006. Similarly, if the
values of house win and house neutral both equal zero, then the respondent voted for the losing
house candidate in 2006. The governor and house variables are intended to capture the winner’s
effect at the state and house-district levels. If a winner’s effect exists at the candidate level, then we
9There exist seven possible changes as respondents may increase or decrease their confidence by any integer in the
set [-3,3]. The loss in efficiency from transforming the scale to [-1,1] is minimal as few observations exist at either ± 2
or ± 3. Finally, the results do not substantively change when running the regressions on the un-collapsed dependent
variable.
10All individuals living in a state that did not hold a gubernatorial election in 2006 are coded as being governor
neutral.
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anticipate that in Model 1 the estimated signs and coefficients for the variables governor win and
house win will be positive and significant.
The baseline categories for the winner’s effect variables are those voters who voted for a los-
ing candidate at the house and state levels following the 2006 election. At the national level the
Democrats retook both Houses of Congress from the Republicans in the 2006 election and we antic-
ipate that, following the 2006 election, Democrats will most likely view themselves as winners and
Republicans will view themselves as losers. Using the 2006 election results and voter party identifi-
cation, it is natural to want to use party identification to capture the winner’s effect at the national
level. However, it is conceivable that using partisan identification to proxy a national winner’s effect
in Model 1 is problematic because of inherent partisan differences in confidence, unrelated to election
results. We recognize that in Model 1 the estimated coefficients for party identification may capture
differences that arise due to differences in preferences and beliefs (Page and Jones 1972; Franklin
1992). However, assuming differences in partisan preferences and beliefs are fixed in the short-run,
the coefficient for Democrat in the dynamic model of voter confidence, Model 2, will estimate the
difference in the likelihood of winners (Democrats) becoming more confident at the national level
following the election.11 In other words, if the estimated effects of the party ID coefficients are
significant in a dynamic model of voter confidence, then we attribute this finding to the national
election results and not some unobserved, ancillary variable.
In order to test the effect of VVPAT devices on electronic voter confidence it was necessary
to determine the respondent’s voting technology and, for electronic voter’s, whether a VVPAT
device was present. We obtained information regarding the voting technologies used by respondents
through a closed-form survey question that asked respondents the type of machine used to cast their
ballot. Respondents were given five voting technology categories from which to choose: electronic,
punch card, paper, lever, and other. Because we were unable to classify individuals who either
did not know the voting technology they used or responded “other” technology, we eliminated
these individuals from the analysis.12 Furthermore, only 16 respondents claimed they voted using
punch card technology and with too few observations to develop a reliable estimate of the effect
of punch card voting on confidence, we omitted these respondents from the analysis. Respondents
who indicated voting via an electronic technology were asked a follow up question that asked if their
electronic machine had a printout to view their vote. We coded the dichotomous variable V V PAT
with a value of 1 if respondents reported voting electronically on a machine that had a printout on
which to view their vote and 0 otherwise. Included on the right-hand side of Models 1 and 2 are
typical socio-economic variables such as age, minority status, gender, and education. In the following
11We anticipate the estimated coefficient for Independents to be positive as, according to a Washington-ABC News
poll, Independents supported Democrat House candidates by a 2-1 margin (Balz and Cohen 2006).
12As all post-election surveys were completed within a week of the election. We believe it is reasonable that voters
recall the specific technology used to cast their ballot. This requirement excluded 3 respondents from the analysis.
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sections, we estimate the regressions discussed above and discuss the findings in the context of the
2006 election.
3.5 Confidence After the 2006 Election
The estimated coefficients for Model 1 are found in Table 3.7 and the corresponding first differ-
ences for the estimated coefficients are found in Table 3.8. When we examine voter confidence fol-
lowing the 2006 election, socio-economic variables only partially predict voter confidence. While the
estimated coefficients for party identification are statistically significant, we find the socio-economic
variables education, age, minority status, and gender do not have a significant effect on voter confi-
dence. However, we find that the variables specific to the context of the voting process are significant
in predicting voter confidence: that is election results and voting technology significantly affect voter
confidence.
Table 3.7: Estimated Coefficients for the Post-Election Model of Confidence
 Coefficient Stand. Error Z Significance
Democrat -.89 .20 -4.6 .00
Independent -.99 .19 -5.2 .00
House win .37 .17 2.2 .03
House neutral .29 .26 1.1 .27
governor win .43 .18 2.5 .01
Governor neutral .19 .20 1.0 .33
Post lever .67 .33 2.0 .05
Post DRE -.47 .17 -2.8 .01
VVPAT 1.21 .26 4.6 .00
Female -.05 .15 -.3 .76
Log education .22 .14 1.5 .14
Age 18-29 -.27 .33 -.8 .42
Age 30-39 -.15 .27 -.6 .57
Age 40-49 -.40 .25 -1.6 .12
Age 50-64 -.14 .22 -.7 .51
Minority -.30 .23 -1.3 .19
Cut 1 -3.86 .36
Cut 2 -2.62 .32
Cut 3 -.44 .30
Number of Obs 722
LR 84.2
Prob > chi2 .00
Log likelihood -670
Pseudo R2 .06
 
Recall that the winner’s effect hypothesis states that, following the election, individuals who
vote for the winning candidate will be more confident relative to individuals who vote for the
losing candidate. The results reported in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present strong evidence that support
the winner’s effect hypothesis. The estimated coefficients for governor win and house win are
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Table 3.8: Estimated First Differences for the Post-election Model of Confidence
 Not 
confident 
 Not too 
confident
 Somewhat
confident
 Very
Confident
 
Median votera .01  .03  .25  .71  
Democrat .02 + .04 + .14 + -.20 +
Independent .02 + .05 + .16 + -.23 +
House win -.01 + -.01 + -.06 + .08 +
House neutral -.00  -.01  -.04  .05  
governor win -.01 + -.01 + -.06 + -.08 +
Governor neutral -.00  -.01  -.03  .04  
Post lever -.01 + -.01 + -.09 + .11 +
Post DRE .01 + .02 + .08 + -.11 +
VVPATb .00 + -.01 + -.11 + .12 +
Female .00  .00  .01  -.01  
Log educationc -.00  -.00  -.02  .02  
Age 18-29 .00  .01  .05  -.06  
Age 30-39 .00  .01  .02  -.03  
Age 40-49 .01  .01  .07  -.09  
Age 50-64 .00  .01  .02  -.03  
Minority .01  .01  .05  -.07  
 
+  Estimate significantly different from zero using a 95% confidence interval. 
 
a The hypothetical median voter possesses the following characteristics: white, age 65+, republican, completed 
 some college, female, used a paper ballot, and does not live in a district controlled by either party. 
 
b  Estimates include the effect of being an electronic voter. 
 
c  Estimates the effect of increasing a respondents education status from high school degree to completing some 
 college. 
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both positive and statistically significant. Specifically, individuals who voted for the winning house
(gubernatorial) candidate are 8 points more likely to be very confident relative to individuals who
voted for the losing house (gubernatorial) candidate.13 Thus, relative to those voters who cast a
ballot for a losing candidate, individuals who voted for the winning gubernatorial or house candidate
are significantly more confident.
We turn now to the second hypothesis regarding the effect VVPAT devices have upon the confi-
dence of electronic voters. Consistent with previous research, the estimated coefficient for electronic
voting in the post-election model is both negative and significant; electronic voters are less confident
relative to voters who use paper ballots. However, when we examine the effect of a VVPAT device
on confidence, we find that electronic voters who have the opportunity to review a printed copy of
their ballot are significantly more likely to be very confident relative to electronic voters who did
not have access to a VVPAT device. Thus, the presence of VVPAT devices significantly increases
voter confidence among electronic voters. Furthermore, following the election, electronic voters who
cast their ballot on a voting machine with a VVPAT are 12 points more likely than paper-based
voters to be very confident.14 Our results indicate that, from the perspective of voter confidence,
the debate over the desirability of electronic versus paper ballots must be placed in the context of
whether or not the voting device is equipped with a VVPAT device.
Additionally, Table 3.8 shows that consistent with previous findings, the confidence gap be-
tween Republicans and Democrats remains following the 2006 election. While at the national level
Democrats were the clear winners in the 2006 election, following the election Republicans confidence
levels remain higher relative to Democrats. Recalling that Republicans are the median voter for the
first differences at the bottom of Table 3.8, we see that the estimated likelihood of a very confident
response among Republican voters is 71% following the 2006 election. Democrats are 20 points less
likely to be very confident relative to Republicans. As noted above, due to the possibility of inherent
differences between Democrats and Republicans, we are unable to estimate a national winner’s effect
using party ID with post-election survey data. However, in the next section we present a model that
estimates a dynamic model of voter confidence, which allows us to estimate if a relationship exists
between party ID and a national winner’s effect.
3.6 Changes in Pre- and Post-Election Confidence
The previous results estimate voter confidence at a particular point in time. However, our
hypotheses consider how changes in the context of an election, specifically the event and outcomes
of an election, affect voter confidence. We investigate the two primary hypotheses more fully in Model
2, where the dependent variable is whether the voter’s confidence increases after the election, remains
13Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level
14Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
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unchanged, or declines (using the values 1, 0, and -1, respectively). The estimated coefficients and
estimated first differences are found in Tables 3.9 and 3.10.
Table 3.9: Estimated Coefficients for the Dynamic Model of Confidence
 Coefficient Stand. Error Z Significance
Democrat 1.04 .22 4.8 .00
Independent .68 .22 3.2 .00
House win -.01 .19 -.1 .96
House neutral .52 .29 1.8 .08
governor win .38 .20 1.9 .06
Governor neutral .40 .22 1.8 .07
Post lever .26 .33 .8 .42
Post DRE -.45 .20 -2.3 .02
VVPAT .67 .26 2.5 .01
Female .30 .17 1.7 .08
Log education -.30 .16 -1.9 .06
Age 18-29 .27 .38 .7 .47
Age 30-39 .10 .30 .3 .75
Age 40-49 .18 .29 .7 .52
Age 50-64 .11 .25 .5 .65
Minority -.03 .26 .1 .91
Cut 1 -1.52 .35
Cut 2 1.71 .35
Number of Obs 578
LR 51.4
Prob > chi2 00
Log likelihood -496
Pseudo R2 .05
 
Recall that we anticipate Democrats will perceive themselves as the victors at the national level.
Thus, if a winner’s effect exists at the national level, then we expect that, following the election,
Democratic confidence rates will be more likely to rise relative to Republicans. Consistent with
the winner’s effect hypothesis, the estimated coefficient in Model 2 for Democrat is positive and
significant. That is, relative to Republican voters, Democrats have a higher probability of increasing
their level of confidence following the 2006 election. Specifically, Democratic voters are 19 points
more likely than Republican voters to express a higher level of confidence following the 2006 mid-
term election.15 The results in Model 2 are consistent with a winner’s effect at the national level
and provide strong evidence that the winner’s effect may be responsible for the reduction in the
confidence gap between Republicans and Democrats following the 2006 election.
Turning our attention to the house and governor races, we find weak support that voting for the
winning house or gubernatorial candidate will significantly affect a voter’s pre-election confidence
level. Although the associated p-value of .06 for the estimated coefficient on governor win is on the
cusp of significance, the estimated coefficient for house win is hardly different than zero and takes
15Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level
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Table 3.10: Estimated First Differences for the Dynamic Model of Confidence
 Less confident  No 
change
 More 
confident 
 
Median votera .17  .66  .17  
Democrat -.10 + -.09  .19 +
Independent -.08 + -.04  .12 +
House win -.00  .00  -.00  
House neutral -.06  -.03  .09  
governor win -.05  -.01  .06  
Governor neutral -.05  -.01  .06  
Post lever -.03  -.01  .04  
Post DRE .07 + -.02  -.05 +
VVPATb -.03  -.01  .04  
Female -.05  .01  .04  
Log educationc .03  .00  -.03  
Age 18-29 -.03  -.01  .04  
Age 30-39 -.01  -.00  .01  
Age 40-49 -.02  -.00  .02  
Age 50-64 -.02  .00  .02  
Minority .01  -.01  .00  
 
+  Estimate significantly different from zero using a 95% confidence interval.  
a The hypothetical median voter possesses the following characteristics: white, age 65+, republican, completed 
 some college, female, used a paper ballot, and does not live in a district controlled by either party.  
b Estimates include the effect of being an electronic voter.  
c Estimates the effect of increasing a respondents education status from high school degree to completing some 
 college 
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the wrong sign. Therefore, we conclude that the outcomes of house and governor races does not
appear to affect voter confidence. Combining this last result with the above post-election results
appears to raise an interesting puzzle: a winner’s effect exists at the house and gubernatorial levels
but the winner’s effect does not alter an individual’s pre-election confidence rate. This result may be
due to a voter’s ability to predict, with a fair degree of accuracy, the outcomes of races about which
the voter is familiar, such as house and gubernatorial races in their own district and state. However,
these same voters may lack the information necessary to predict outcomes at the national level.16
Although local election results may be factored into pre-election levels of confidence, uncertainty
regarding national election results may lead to voters to alter their pre-election confidence levels.
Continuing to investigate contextual explanations for the increase in voter confidence following
the 2006 election, we turn our attention to the second hypothesis, which looks at the effect of
VVPAT devices on voter confidence. Here, we find that, following the election, individuals using an
electronic voting technology without a VVPAT device are 5 points more likely to see a decrease in
their confidence relative to paper voters.17 However, VVPAT voters are a statistically significant
11 points more likely to become more confident following the election relative to regular electronic
voters.18 Finally, the estimates in Table 3.10 suggest that voters who vote using paper ballots and
electronic ballots with a VVPAT are equally likely to experience an increase in confidence following
the election. We conclude that the effect of voting technology on the probability that a voter changes
their assessment of confidence is important, as it may provide an avenue that election administrators
can take to improve voter confidence. Contrary to advocates who propose either an entirely paper-
based or an electronic voting technology, the evidence presented above highlights the need for voting
machines to produce what voters see as independent, verifiable results.
3.7 Conclusions
By leveraging the 2006 electoral environment, we test whether the context of an election, the
election outcome and technology used to cast a ballot, affect the confidence voters have that their
ballots will be counted accurately. Using 2006 post-election survey data, we test the hypothesis
that voters who cast their vote for the winning house and gubernatorial candidates possess higher
rates of confidence following the election. Furthermore, we investigate the existence of a winner’s
effect at the national level by analyzing 2006 panel data comprised of pre- and post-election survey
data. Finally, we analyze whether administrative changes that required many states to attach voter
verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) devices to electronic voting machines resulted in higher levels
16For instance, at the national level empirical evidence suggests voters consistently predict the outcomes of presi-
dential elections, and that correct predictions are correlated with information (Lewis-Beck and Tien 1999).
17Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level
18Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level
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of voter confidence. The large-scale adoption of VVPAT devices allows us to test the confidence
rates of two sub-groups of electronic voters at the national level.
The first hypothesis we test is that voters who vote for winning candidates are more confident
that their ballot was counted correctly. Specifically, we test whether voting for the winning candidate
leads to higher levels of confidence relative to voters who voted for the losing candidate. We test
this hypothesis at the individual candidate level using self-reported voting results and house and
gubernatorial election results. The empirical results support the conclusion that, following the
election, voters who vote for the winning candidate in a house or governor race express significantly
higher levels of confidence relative to voters who vote for the losing candidates. Additionally, a
dynamic model of voter confidence that measures changes in a voter’s confidence, before and after
the election, suggests that a winner’s effect exists at the national level. Although Republicans
are more confident than Democrats before the election, we find evidence that the confidence gap
between Republicans and Democrats shrinks following the 2006 election. We attribute this finding
to the existence of a winner’s effect at the national level where Democrats identify themselves as the
winners, and Republicans the losers, of the 2006 election.
The second hypothesis we test is that in the context of electronic voting, the presence or absence
of a VVPAT device significantly affects voter confidence. Our results show that when electronic
voting machines are not equipped with a VVPAT device that electronic voters are significantly less
confident relative to paper voters. However, we find that in a national sample of electronic voters
the addition of a VVPAT device significantly increases the confidence rate of electronic voters.
Furthermore, estimates of the change in a voter’s confidence rate, as measured by the difference in
a voter’s confidence before and after the election, are statistically equivalent between voters who
cast an electronic ballot in the presence of a VVPAT device and voters who cast a paper ballot. We
conclude that in discussing the effect of electronic voting upon voter confidence, it is necessary to
frame the debate in the context of whether or not a VVPAT device is present.
This empirical evidence lends strong support to the conclusion that, in order to understand voter
confidence, it is first necessary to understand the context of an election. The possibility that the
factors that predict voter confidence, and to some extent contribute to voter confidence, may vary
depending upon the context of the election and timing of the survey is an important question. Only
through additional research on voter confidence can academics begin to understand fully the subtle
nuances that comprise a voter’s perception of confidence in the American electoral process.
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The following chapter was written in association with Charles R. Plott. All authors contributed
equally to the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
Information Revelation in
Committees
4.1 Motivation
During the recent economic crisis, Congress commissioned a number of committees to gather
information and propose policies to stabilize the financial and auto sectors. These committees fre-
quently relied on the information and policy recommendations provided by corporate executives and
industry spokespeople. Numerous media, shareholder rights, and political watchdog groups called
into question the prudence of using industry insiders to provide objective policy recommendations.
These organizations expressed concern that industry insiders may recommend self-serving legisla-
tion rather than policies that are in the best interests of citizens and consumers. These concerns
appear justified given the actions of bailout recipients: AIG used bailout funds to pay $165 million
in bonuses to 168 employees and Bank of America spent approximately $10 million on a Super Bowl
party (Zumbrun 2009; Berger 2009). This article analyzes whether the rules and procedures com-
mon to most committees transfer information from biased, privately informed experts to committee
members.
Through competition among self-interested insiders, market-relevant information known to in-
siders is revealed to uninformed outsiders; in properly designed financial markets (Plott and Sunder
1982, 1988; Glosten and Milgrom 1984; Forsythe and Lundholm 1990). However, in the context
of committee decisions made via majority rule, few studies examine whether committee rules and
procedures affect information revelation.1 Through an experimental design we analyze whether typ-
ical committee procedures result in information revelation when the committee relies on information
held by nonvoting, biased, privately informed experts. This research is relevant to a large number of
political problems, from Congressional committees to the local school boards, where committees rely
on outside experts to provide the committee members with relevant policy recommendations. Using
1One exception is Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) who consider the order of information revelation when committee
members possess private, asymmetric information.
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laboratory experiments numerous hypotheses are tested to conclude if: (1) procedures similar to
Robert’s Rules of Order lead to information revelation in a multimember committee and (2) within
the framework of Robert’s Rules of Order can we identify committee procedures that result in better
policy recommendations from biased, self-informed experts? The results have strong implications on
the rules and procedures committees should employ when gathering information from experts who
have incentives to provide false testimony.
In the context of information revelation applied to problems in political science, information
about a realized state variable is often modeled as traveling from an informed, biased expert to a
group of uninformed decision makers who are responsible for implementing a policy that is affected
by some unobserved random variable (Crawford and Sobel 1982; Green and Stokey 2007). The
design is one of cheap talk as the expert’s payoff is determined by the action of the decision maker
and is unaffected by the expert’s decision of whether or not to lie about the realized state. In models
of cheap talk where policies exist in a single dimensional, biased experts do not fully reveal their
private information (Crawford and Sobel 1982; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; Austen-Smith 1993;
Krishna and Morgan 2001).2 In an extension of earlier work, Sobel (1985) analyzes the effect of
expert credibility on information revelation and finds experts feign friendliness in order to develop
a good reputation. Building on the credibility literature Morris (2001) develops a model with a
single expert and decision maker and finds that no information may be conveyed when experts
have preferences over their reputation. Analyzing information revelation under a different set of
assumptions, Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) show that when committee members possess private
information herding may result in poor public outcomes.
Contrary to results over a single dimension, Battaglini (2002) finds the existence of a fully
revealing equilibrium with multiple experts in a multidimensional space. However, this result is called
into question when the effective policy space is restricted, as the committee may be unable to adopt
a policy that adequately punishes experts for lying (Ambrus and Takahashi 2006). Additionally,
when an expert’s bias goes to infinity, then any information revelation hurts the expert’s expected
payoff and results show that in such cases no information will be revealed. (Ambrus and Takahashi
2006; Levy and Razin 2005). Finally, criticism has been leveled at theoretical models as these
models tend to ignore potential complications arising from a committee comprised of ideologically
extreme individuals (Londregan and Snyder 1994). This critique of theoretical results is strengthened
by Krehbiel (1991) who concludes in a discussion of U.S. Congressional committees that “their
composition is heterogeneous almost without exception.”
Dependent upon the dimensionality, outcome space, number of experts, and magnitude of the
expert biases, the research literature produces a variety of predictions about the theoretical existence
2This literature focuses on the decision of either a committee comprised of individuals possessing the same ideal
point, or the decision of the median committee member.
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of a fully revealing equilibrium. While considering the question of information revelation in commit-
tees, we analyze information revelation under a specific set of procedural rules. We use experiments
to test information revelation in a multi-dimensional space with multiple experts as: (1) we are
interested in assessing whether specific committee procedures result in information revelation, and
(2) theory is relatively silent on how results may change in a majority rule setting with committee
members possessing heterogeneous preferences.
While related to previous work on information revelation, the experimental results reported
here are not a direct test of the above theoretical models. Our experimental design differs from the
above theoretical models along several dimensions. In addition to largely ignoring the heterogeneous
preferences of committee members, previous theoretical research is often silent on the committee
rules and procedures employed to reach a decision. Accounting for these two items, we consider
information revelation in a multimember committee, where individual members have heterogeneous
preferences, and the committee follows procedures similar to Robert’s Rules of Order. Additionally,
we account for the Londregan and Snyder (1994) critique as we consider a committee with multiple
members who possess extreme preferences relative to both experts and other committee members.
The committee process studied here is that of an otherwise uninformed committee obtaining
information through the policy recommendations of privately informed, self-interested experts. This
is a model of cheap talk where experts are required to provide policy recommendations, and are
neither punished for lying or allowed to vote with the committee. Committee members know some-
thing about the preferences of the experts so that expert recommendations and any bias in those
recommendations become part of the information process. After observing expert policy recommen-
dations, committee members use majority rule and procedures similar to Roberts’ Rules of Order
to select a policy from the x-y coordinate plane. As experts have the opportunity and incentive to
distort the truth, we use laboratory experiments to analyze whether slight variations in committee
procedures significantly affect the transmission of information from experts to committees. The next
section presents the distribution of committee and expert preferences, and how uncertainty over state
variables affects preferences over policy outcomes. The experimental design and procedures are then
discussed, followed by models of committee decisions and behavior. Finally, the committee decisions
are analyzed to determine: (1) if information revelation occurs when the committee operates under
procedures similar to Robert’s Rules of Order and (2) precise rules that lead to greater information
revelation in the context of Robert’s Rules of Order.
4.2 Overview
The committee problem is to choose a point in a two-dimensional space using a simplified version
of Robert’s Rules of Order. Much is known about the behavior of such committees when committee
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members have well-formed preferences. When committee members are fully informed over their
individual preferences and there exists a median voter in all dimensions, then the committee decision
is the ideal point of the median voter (Plott 1967; Fiorina and Plott 1978). This article focuses on
committee behavior when committee members have uncertainty over their preferences, such as when
preferences depend on unobserved events or random state variables.
In order to understand how uncertainty affects committee member preferences over outcomes,
consider a case in which committee members possess no uncertainty in their preferences over the
outcome space. Group A of Figure 4.1 represents a five-person committee where each solid dot
is the ideal point for a different committee member in a two-dimensional space. That is, each
committee member is told the outcome that translates into their highest possible payoff (ideal point)
and is distributed according to Group A of Figure 4.1. By construction, if committee members
know their ideal points, then the distribution of preferences in A of Figure 4.1 results in a unique
equilibrium committee decision; equal to the ideal point of the median voter (the third committee
member). Furthermore, when committee members are told their ideal points, the relative preferences
of committee members are always the same.
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Figure 4.1: Committees & Preferences
Now suppose that committee members have uncertainty over whether their ideal points are
those found in group A or group B of Figure 4.1. This scenario resembles a committee decision
when the desirability of an action is affected by an unobserved state variable. In this situation,
when committee member preferences over outcomes are dependent upon a randomly drawn state of
nature, then uncertainty over this random state becomes uncertainty over preferences. Ultimately,
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uncertainty over preferences implies that the committee’s decision is dependent upon the individual
committee members’ information and beliefs over the unobserved state variable.
4.3 The Committee Problem
4.3.1 Preferences and Relationship to States
Each period committee members must pass a policy decision via majority rule under procedures
similar to Robert’s Rules of Order. The committee decision is a point in the x-y coordinate plane
and determines the period payoff for all committee members and experts. Committee members and
experts have state-dependent, Euclidean preferences. Thus, at time t preferences and payoffs over
any point vary depending upon the realization of two random state variables, (Sxt,Syt). A realization
of sxt shifts all ideal points along the x-axis by the amount sxt, while a realization of syt shifts all
ideal points along the y-axis by the amount syt. Figure 4.2 plots the ideal points of the committee
members and experts after a realization of (sxt=0,syt=0); where circles represent the ideal points of
committee members and the diamonds represent the ideal points of experts.
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Figure 4.2: Committees’ Base Preferences
In the experiments below the state is always known by experts and thus experts always know
their own preferences. Experts do not vote in committee decisions, but provide information to
the committee through policy recommendations. The preferences of the experts relative to the
committee members are always in the same proximity as shown in Figure 4.2. We define dyadic
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competition as the configuration of ideal points found in Figure 4.2. That is dyadic competition
occurs when experts’ ideal points are symmetrically distributed about a voter who is the median
in all directions. Given this symmetric distribution and Euclidean preferences, there is no point
(xt,yt) that both experts prefer to (xct,yct). Thus, in a nonrepeated game with expert preferences
distributed according to Figure 4.2, dyadic competition implies there are no incentives for expert
collusion.
Committee and expert ideal points are dependent upon the state and thus vary with different
realizations of the random state variables. Figure 4.3 plots the ideal points of committee members
and experts following the realization of state (30,30). Given Euclidean preferences over the outcome,
observation of (sxt,syt) alters not only individual ideal points, but preferences over the policy space.
When committee members observe the realized state values, then a unique equilibrium exists (Plott
1967; Fiorina and Plott 1978); where this equilibrium is equal to the median voter’s ideal point.
Thus, under perfect private information there exists a point (xct,yct) which is the unique Nash
equilibrium committee outcome and is equal to the ideal point of the median committee member
(Fiorina and Plott 1978).
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Figure 4.3: Committees’ State-Dependent Preferences
4.3.2 Information
Different information environments are analyzed to determine if rules and procedures affect
information revelation when biased experts provide policy recommendations to a heterogeneous
committee. In these experiments the “testimony” of an expert is a policy recommendation; that is
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a single point in the x-y coordinate plane. Experts are perfectly informed regarding the realization
of the random state variables, but do not possess voting rights. Committee members possess voting
rights, but their information over the realized state is dependent upon the information environment.
As preferences depend upon the state, the information about the realized state is crucial to well-
formed preferences over the outcome space. Four different information environments are used to
analyze information revelation and test the two main hypotheses.
In the first information environment, the realized state values, (sxt,syt), are publicly revealed to
all committee members prior to the start of a period. In this information environment, no uncertainty
exists over state values and experts do not provide recommendations. Experiments conducted under
the first information environment estimate the upper bound of information revelation.
The second information environment represents a scenario in which committee members publicly
observe the distributions, fx and fy, which generate the two random variables. Information regarding
the realizations of the two random variables is prohibited in this information environment, thus
experts are excluded. The second information environment replicates a scenario where members
know the distributions of relevant state variables but do not receive additional information regarding
state realizations. By only providing committee members with knowledge over the distributions of
the state variables, the second information environment provides an estimate to the lower bound of
information revelation.3
In order to test our main hypotheses about information revelation under Roberts’ Rules of
Order, two different information environments are analyzed; feedback and no-feedback. In both
the feedback and no-feedback environments two perfectly informed, biased experts provide policy
recommendations to the committee. In the third or feedback information environment the realized
state variables (sxt,syt) are publicly revealed following each committee decision, (xt,yt). However, in
the fourth or no-feedback information environment the realized state values (sxt,syt) for period t are
not revealed until after the conclusion of the experiment. Thus, the ability of committee members
to assess the accuracy of prior expert recommendations depends on the information environment.
The feedback and no-feedback experiments are used to model committee procedures that ei-
ther facilitate or restrict the development of an expert’s credibility or reputation. Specifically, the
feedback environment represents a procedure that requires the committee to repeatedly solicit infor-
mation from the same set of experts. In the no-feedback environment committee members possesses
little or no information over the accuracy of an expert’s previous recommendation. Thus, the no-
feedback environment is similar to a committee procedure that stipulates new experts be consulted
for each new policy decision.
3The median voter’s expected ideal point provides only an estimate of the lower bound. It is possible that expert
recommendations may confuse committee members to a large enough degree that an environment that solicits expert
recommendations may result in less information revelation.
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4.4 Experimental Design
4.4.1 The Committee Rule and Procedures
In each period the five-person committee must pass a policy, (xt,yt), belonging to the x-y co-
ordinate plane. Ideal points are distributed such that under full information a unique equilibrium
exists which is the median voter’s ideal point (Plott 1967). Each period, the individual payoff for
each participant was determined by the committee decision. Except for procedures specific to the
information environment, the committee procedures are the same under all experimental conditions.
Each period started with an initial status quo of (200,150). Upon recognition by the committee
chair, who was the experimenter, a committee member proposed an amendment to the existing sta-
tus quo. Each proposal must receive verbal support from a second committee member, other than
the proposer, in order for the proposal to proceed to the committee floor for a vote.
Once a proposal reached the floor, the committee was free to discuss the proposal. Individual
committee members were free to discuss in what direction they preferred the proposal to move,
but were prohibited from discussing specific points or payoffs.4 Following conclusion of debate, the
committee simultaneously and publicly voted on whether or not to accept the proposal; abstention
was not allowed. If a majority of the committee agreed to adopt an amendment, then that amend-
ment became the new status quo. If a majority of committee members voted against the current
amendment, then the status quo remained unchanged. Thus, passing a proposal simply changed
the current status quo and did not end the period. Committee members were free to make as many
proposals as they wished during a period.
At any time during the proposal process a committee member could make a motion to end debate
at which time the entire committee immediately voted whether to accept or reject the current status
quo. If a majority of committee members voted to accept the current status quo, then the period
immediately ended and payoffs for that period were determined by the current status quo. If a
majority of committee members voted against accepting the current status quo, then the proposal
process continued from the point of interruption.5
In addition to committee members, the experiments conducted under the feedback and no-
feedback information environments contained two experts. In each period, experts possessed perfect
private information of the state variables (sxt,syt): where sxt and sxt were independently drawn from
the uniform distribution, [0, 50]. Prior to the first proposal expert j was required to make a policy
recommendation, (xjt,yjt), to the committee. Experts and committee members were told that the
point (xjt,yjt) represented j’s most preferred policy outcome. The initial recommendation process
4That is committee members where able to say whether they approved or disapproved of the current proposal.
Additionally, committee members were free to state in what spatial direction they would prefer to see the current
proposal moved.
5There were no rules that blocked the committee from rejecting a status quo during the motion to end debate and
later passing the same status quo as the final committee decision.
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consisted of two actions. First, an expert privately committed to a recommendation by writing
(xjt,yjt) on a piece of paper. Second, the expert publicly declared the point (xjt,yjt) aloud to the
entire committee.6
4.4.2 Experimental Conditions
There were four experimental conditions: each experimental condition corresponds to a differ-
ent information environment. Each experimental condition consisted of at least one experiment
containing multiple periods or policy decisions. The committee decision determined the payoff for
both committee members and experts for each period. Committee members possessed different ideal
points and preferences over the outcome space. Therefore, the decision point which resulted in the
highest payoff to one committee member did not result in the highest payoff to another member.
Committee members did not know the ideal points of the other committee members. However, com-
mittee members did know the spatial direction (up, down, left, right) of their preferences relative to
the preferences of other committee members.
In the experimental conditions containing experts, conditional upon observing (sxt,syt) committee
members could locate each expert’s ideal point. Thus, given policy recommendations corresponding
to different realizations of the state variables, committee members could infer if at least one expert
was lying. However, it is important to note that in this scenario committee members were only able
to infer whether an expert was lying and could not tell if both experts were lying. Additionally,
committee members were not able to distinguish through the recommendations which expert was
lying.7 Below we outline the four experimental conditions labeled Series 1, Series 2, Series 3, and
Series 4 which correspond to one of the four information environments studied.
Series 1: Public Revelation of Realized State Values
Prior to the start of each period t, committee members were publicly told the realized state values
(sxt,syt). The committee proceeded with proposals, deliberation, voting, and ultimate choice from
among the X-Y coordinate plane. Experts did not participate in the ideal point information exper-
imental condition. Since the state was known, payoffs were computed and recorded following each
period.
Series 2: Public Revelation of Distributions Used to Draw State Values
Prior to the start of each period t, committee members were publicly told the distributions, fx and
fy, of the two random variables; where fx∼u[0,50] and fy∼u[0,50].8 Other than the difference in
the revelation of information and that payoffs were not computed until the completion of the final
period the Series II condition is identical to that of the Series I condition.
6Experts alternated who gave the first public recommendation.
7Additionally, committee members did not possess information regarding the ideal points of the experts relative
to other committee members.
8The distribution of the random variables fx and fy was kept constant across all periods and information environ-
ments.
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Series 3: Experts with Feedback
Before the first proposal in any period, the realized state values, (sxt,syt), were privately told to
both experts; committee members did not observe realized state values. Each expert was required
to write a policy recommendation on paper, and then the expert stated this point as the expert’s
most preferred policy outcome. After expert policy recommendations, the proposal process began.
Following the committee’s decision to pass a specific policy, the state values were publicly revealed
to all committee members. At the end of each period, experts and committee members computed
their individual payoffs for that period.
Series 4: Experts without Feedback
The experimental condition for Series 4 is identical to that of Series 3 except that in this condition
committee members did not observe the realized state value following the conclusion of each period.
Committee members were told the true state values for all periods following the conclusion of the final
period; at which time individuals computed their payoffs for each individual period. Thus, unlike
Series 3 the Series 4 condition prohibited committee members from evaluating the truthfulness of
an expert’s previous recommendation.
4.4.3 Experiments
A total of 16 experiments were conducted. The experiment dates, experimental condition, and
total number of periods are listed in Table 4.1. While the realized state values vary across periods
within an experiment, the values of (sxt,syt) for period t were kept identical across experiments. The
list of realized state values, (sxt,syt), is found in Table 4.2. There were a total of 7 periods under
each of the Series 1 and 2 conditions while the Series 3 and 4 experiments contained 62 and 72
periods. The number of periods for the Series 1 and 2 conditions is smaller as theory, prior research
by Fiorina and Plott (1978), and experimental results suggest additional periods were unnecessary.
The Series 1 and 2 experiments contained 5 subjects with one additional individual being em-
ployed as a scribe. The Series 3 and 4 experiments contained 7 subjects with one additional scribe.
Our subject pool is comprised primarily of Caltech undergraduates with three Caltech and one
UCLA graduate student and one non-affiliated adult. Recruiting was primarily done through email
where individuals belonging to the Caltech social science experiment pool received an invitation to
participate in an experiment. Additional recruitment took place in undergraduate economics and
political science classes taught on Caltech’s campus.
4.4.4 Experimental Procedures
At the beginning of each session, the experimenter randomly assigned participants to committee
or expert positions. Each participant was provided with the following materials: a printed copy of the
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List of Experiments Information 
Number of 
Periods 
   
Series I   
20060507(a) Perfect Information 7 
   
Series II   
20060607(b) No Information 7 
   
Series III   
20060114 Feedback 5 
20060301(a) Feedback 8 
20060301(b) Feedback 10 
20060305 Feedback 11 
20060308 Feedback 9 
20060430 Feedback 9 
20060502 Feedback 10 
   
   
Series IV   
20060125 No Feedback 10 
20060128 No Feedback 9 
20060129 No Feedback 11 
20060304(a) No Feedback 12 
20060304(b) No Feedback 12 
20060512 No Feedback 9 
20060513 No Feedback 9 
 
Table 4.1: List of Experiments
Period sxt syt 
1 25.1 46.5 
2 35.5 18 
3 18.6 41.1 
4 16.7 6 
5 9.8 6.8 
6 22.6 25.9 
7 1.7 31.1 
8 12.6 5.3 
9 33.4 21.2 
10 26.2 25.3 
11 2.6 19.1 
12 45.9 7.2 
 
Table 4.2: Realized States for All Experiments
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instructions, ruler, calculator, two pencils, several pieces of scratch paper, and a hand written note
informing the participant of their state-dependent ideal point. Additionally, participants were given
pieces of paper containing a printed x-y coordinate plane. Located on each committee member’s x-y
coordinate plane was a shaded 50x50 box where the center of the box represented the committee
member’s ideal point given a realized state of (25,25). Committee members were told that regardless
of the state, their highest payoff was always located within the shaded box. Finally, each committee
member was given a transparency which contained a point representing the committee member’s
ideal point and a series of curves representing the committee member’s indifference curves. By
placing the transparency over the shaded box, participants could calculate their period payoff for
any state realization.9 In the Series 3 and 4 experiments the transparency also contained the ideal
points of the two experts relative to the ideal point of the committee member.10 Following sincere
expert recommendations the committee members could use the transparency to locate their and the
experts’ precise ideal point.
After all participants were seated the experimenter read the instructions aloud to the entire group
and answered questions raised during the course of this process. At the conclusion of the instructions
the experimenter reiterated that all subjects would be paid in cash following the conclusion of the
experiment. Finally, participants were told that the number of periods was predetermined and the
group would be notified when the experiment was over after the conclusion of the final period.
After the instructions were read and any questions had been answered, participants were told the
first period would be considered a practice round, for which they would be paid, and the relevant
state information would be revealed to all participants following the first period. Upon the conclusion
of the first round, the experimenter would verify that each participant understood the instructions
and could properly calculate their payoff from the first period. At the conclusion of the experiment,
subjects totaled their payoffs from each period, as well as the practice round, and were paid in cash.
Experiments averaged about two hours and subject payoffs ranged between $18 and $45 dollars with
most subjects receiving between $25 and $35 dollars.
4.5 Hypotheses of Behavior & Information revelation
In order to determine if common committee procedures reveal information from biased experts,
it is necessary to first determine if the committee decision reflects the information held by the com-
9Subjects calculated their own payoffs using the indifference curves on the transparencies provided. After revelation
of the state values, committee members could determine their payoffs by overlaying the transparency on the 200x150
x-y coordinate plane. Using the indifference curves printed on the transparency, committee members calculated their
payoffs through a legend that gave a specific number of Konars for each indifference curve. For decisions landing
between two indifference curves subjects were instructed to approximate the difference between the two curves. Each
subject was provided with a conversion factor which translated Konars into dollars; where conversion factors varied
among committee members.
10Thus, given committee members knew the state, then committee members could calculate the ideal points of the
two experts.
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mittee. The first hypothesis considers the information environment where the committee members
have full information over their individual preferences. The second hypothesis addresses the infor-
mation environment where committee members only know the distributions used to draw the state
variables. In both hypotheses, it is assumed that the committee decision reflects rational committee
behavior; that is members try to maximize their individual expected payoffs.
Hypothesis 1: Given full information about their individual ideal points, committee will im-
plement the full information equilibrium (median voter’s ideal point).11
Hypothesis 2: Given only knowledge over the distributions used to draw the state variables,
the committee will implement the median voter’s expected ideal point.12
The motivation for this paper is to determine whether: (1) procedures similar to Robert’s Rules
of Order lead to information revelation, and (2) within the framework of Robert’s Rules of Order
do specific procedures lead to more informed policy decision. These two questions are stated in the
following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3: When operating under rules similar to Roberts’ Rules of Order, the committee
decision will reveal information from nonvoting, privately informed, biased experts.
Hypothesis 4: Committee decisions are closer to the fully informed equilibrium under the
feedback information environment; relative to the no-feedback information environment.
In both the feedback and no-feedback environments, experts are the greatest source of informa-
tion. If committee decisions are found to reflect the amount of information held by the committee,
then it is necessary to consider the behavior of experts. Additionally, it is necessary to consider how
the different committee rules may affect expert behavior.
Hypothesis 5: Through their policy recommendation, experts will reveal their true ideal point.
Hypothesis 6: Expert recommendations will be uninformative.
Hypothesis 7: The distance between expert recommendations is less under the feedback infor-
mation environment; relative to the no-feedback information environment.
Hypothesis 8: If the distance between recommendations does not match committee member
expectations, then the committee will implement a decision that punishes one or both experts.13
The next section tests the above hypotheses. Each of the following results is a test of the
hypothesis with the corresponding number; thus Result X is a test of Hypothesis X. Following a
presentation of the results, the implications of these findings are discussed.
11This hypothesis is supported by both theoretical and experimental results (Plott 1967; Fiorina and Plott 1978).
12This is equivalent to stating that absent additional information about the state variables, committee members
will behave as expected utility maximizers.
13Recall that committee members possess a priori information regarding the state-independent distance between
the ideal points of the experts. If expert recommendations are inconsistent with a priori information, then due to
either purposeful action or uncertainty over preferences the committee decision punishes one or both experts.
52
4.6 Results
Result 1: When all committee members know their individual ideal points, the committee
decision approximates the fully informed equilibrium (median voter’s ideal point).
Support: Prior to the start of the proposal process in the Series 1 experiment, the two state
variables were publicly revealed to the committee members. Series 1 committee decisions, (xt,yt),
are plotted in Figure 4.4 and normalized to the fully informed equilibrium, (xct,yct). The committee
decisions under perfect information are nearly identical to the fully informed equilibrium. The
average distance between committee decision and fully informed equilibrium was 1.1 units with a
standard deviation of .5 units. 14 These results are consistent with findings by Fiorina and Plott
(1978) and we conclude that under perfect information the committee decisions are near the fully
informed equilibrium.
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Figure 4.4: Series 1 Committee Decisions: Full Information
Result 2: If committee members only know the distribution used to draw the state variables,
then the committee decisions are consistent with the median voter’s expected ideal point.
Support: Figure 4.5 plots the seven committee decisions made under the Series 2 experimental
condition where committee decisions, (xt,yt), are normalized to the median voter’s expected ideal
point. Only two points are visible in Figure 4.5 as the committee implemented only two distinct
decision points over the seven periods.15 When committee members possess knowledge only over
the distributions of the random variables, the average Euclidean distance between the committee
decision and the median voter’s expected ideal point was 1.3 units with a standard deviation of .5
units. Thus, under an information environment where committee members only possess knowledge
14We speculate that a portion of this difference is due to the state variables being distributed continuously distributed
along the interval [0,50]. Committee members appeared to ignore the information after the decimal point and always
made proposals in whole numbers.
15The differences along the x and y axes between the predicted equilibrium and the committee decision was (0,1)
for five observations and (2,0) for two observations.
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over the distributions that generate the state variables, the committee decision is consistent with
behavior that maximizes expected utility.
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Figure 4.5: Series 2 Committee Decisions: Expected Ideal Point
Result 3: Under dyadic competition and procedures similar to Robert’s Rules of Order, the
committee process reveals information from biased, nonvoting experts.
Support: In order to determine if the committee process leads to purposeful and meaningful
information revelation we analyze three questions. First, do committee decisions differ when com-
mittees receive expert policy recommendations relative to committees that possess knowledge only
over the distribution of the possible state? Second, does the fully informed equilibrium provide
a better prediction of the committee decision relative to the median voter’s expected ideal point?
Finally, when committees receive expert recommendations, is the average committee decision closer
to the fully informed equilibrium or the median voter’s expected ideal point?
Turning attention to the first of these questions, the committee decisions under the Series 3 and
4 experimental conditions are normalized to the median voter’s expected ideal point and plotted in
Figures 4.6 and 4.7. Clear patterns emerge in these figures as the vertical lines tend to represent
periods with the same state realizations. The existence of state-dependent patterns suggests that
the deviations between the fully informed equilibrium and the committee decisions under the Series
3 and 4 information conditions are not entirely random.
A comparison of how well the two outcome models predict the committee results under the Series
3 and 4 conditions are located in Table 4.3. If committee members have beliefs that the expert
recommendations are uninformative, then by Result (2) the Series 3 and 4 committee decisions will
approximate the median voter’s expected ideal point. A t-test rejects the hypothesis that the average
distance between the committee decision and the full information equilibrium is equal to the average
distance between the Series 2 decisions and the median voter’s expected ideal point (Series 3 t=14,
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Figure 4.6: Series 3 Committee Decisions: Expected Ideal Point
Plot of Committee Decisions Normalized to the 
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Figure 4.7: Series 4 Committee Decisions: Expected Ideal Point
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Series 4 t=14). Thus, on average the committee decision is significantly different than the median
voter’s expected ideal point.
 Fully Informed 
Equilibrium 
 Median Voter’s
Expected Ideal 
Point 
 
     
Series 1 17.9 (2.8) a 1.3 (3.5) a 
     
Series 2 1.1 (.2) a 16.4 (.2)a 
     
Series 3 6.9 (.6)a 14.6 (.9)a 
     
Series 4 9.5 (.7) a 13.4 (.8)a 
     
 
a - This is the standard error which is computed as 
n
s . 
 
Table 4.3: Summary of Committee Decisions by Series
Turning our attention to the full information equilibrium, we investigate whether expert recom-
mendations fully reveal the state variables (sxt,syt). Figures 4.8 and 4.9 plot the committee decision
normalized to the median voter’s ideal point. Contrary to results in the distribution limited infor-
mation case, no strong patterns emerge as the distribution of committee decisions appears to be
randomly distributed about the median voter’s ideal point. However, expert recommendations are
not fully revealing, as the average distance between the full information equilibrium and the com-
mittee decision is greater under the Series 3 and Series 4 conditions relative to the Series 1 condition
(t=8,t=11).
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Figure 4.8: Series 3 Committee Decisions: Fully Informed Equilibrium
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Figure 4.9: Series 4 Committee Decisions: Fully Informed Equilibrium
While neither the full information equilibrium nor median voter’s expected ideal point predict
the committee decision in Series 3 or 4, it is possible that the full information equilibrium is a better
predictor of the committee decision. Across the Series 3 and 4 conditions the full information equi-
librium provides a closer approximation of the committee decision in 82% and 64% of observations;
relative to the median voter’s expected ideal point. Binomial tests reject at the 95% significance
level the hypothesis that in 50% of observations the committee decision is closer to the median
voter’s expected ideal point relative to the fully informed equilibrium. The 95% confidence interval
associated with this binomial test is [.71, .91] under the Series 3 condition and [.52, .75] under the
Series 4 condition. Thus, in both the Series 3 and 4 conditions the full information equilibrium is
a more accurate predictor of the committee decision relative to the median voter’s expected ideal
point.
Finally, Table 4.3 shows the average distance between the committee decision and the full in-
formation equilibrium and the median voter’s expected ideal point. Analyzing the experimental
results, the average distance between the committee decision under the Series 3 and 4 environments
is significantly closer to the fully informed equilibrium relative to the median voter’s expected ideal
point (t=-7.0 for Series 3, t =-3.6 for Series 4). Thus, on average, the fully informed equilibrium is
a better predictor of the committee decision.
In conclusion, experimental results support the claim that information revelation occurs in the
Series 3 and 4 conditions. This conclusion is based on experimental results that find: (1) the
committee decision implements a point significantly different than that predicted by the median
voter’s expected ideal point, (2) the committee process results in a decision that is consistently
closer to the fully informed equilibrium relative to the median voter’s expected ideal point and (3)
the fully informed equilibrium is on average a better predictor of the committee decision.
Result 4: Committee decisions are closer to the fully informed equilibrium under the feedback
information environment.
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Support: In the feedback experiments the 95% confidence interval for the average distance
between the fully informed equilibrium and the committee decision is [5.7, 8.1]. The corresponding
95% confidence interval for the no-feedback experiments is [8.2, 10.9]. Thus, the estimated average
distance between the committee decision and the median voter’s ideal point is significantly less under
the feedback environment.
Result 5: Experts do not sincerely reveal their ideal points.
Support: Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show expert recommendations normalized to their state-dependent
ideal points for the Series 3 and 4 experimental conditions.16 Expert A’s recommendations are de-
noted by a diamond while B’s recommendations are denoted by a triangle. The graphical evidence
shows that expert A’s recommendations tend to lie in the second quadrant while B’s lie in the fourth
quadrant. Given A’s (B’s) ideal point relative to the fully informed equilibrium lies in the second
(fourth) quadrant, A’s (B’s) recommendations appear to be an attempt to influence the committee
decision. Across both the Series 3 and 4 conditions the average Euclidean distance between an
expert’s recommendation and the expert’s ideal point is 9.4 units with a standard error of .6. Thus,
the average Euclidean distance between an expert’s recommendation and their true ideal points is
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. In the Series 3 condition, only 11 of 124 (8.8%)
expert recommendations are within 1 unit of the expert’s ideal point. In the Series 4 experiments,
just 1 of 144 expert recommendations was within 1 unit of the expert’s ideal point. Thus, regardless
of the feedback condition experts do not consistently reveal their true ideal points.
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Figure 4.10: Expert Policy Recommendations: Series 3
Result 6: Expert recommendations are informative.
Support: While the recommendations in 4.10 and 4.11 indicate experts do not truthfully re-
veal their ideal points, about 65% of recommendations in both the Series 3 and 4 experiments
are located within 10 units of the expert’s ideal point. Thus, while not truthfully revealing their
16Three outliers were eliminated from the Series 4 graph in an effort to make the graph reader friendly.
58
 
Plot of Sender Recommendations Normalized to 
the Sender's Ideal Point: Series 4
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
Figure 4.11: Expert Policy Recommendations: Series 4
ideal points, experts tend to provide recommendations relatively near their ideal points regardless
of the feedback environment. If experts submitted uninformative recommendations, consistent with
recommendations at opposite corners of the state space, then the distance between these recommen-
dations would be 70.7 units. An analysis of the data reveals not one period in which both experts
provide recommendations consistent with the corners of the state space. Finally, while not com-
pletely uninformative, experts may choose to submit recommendations that are uninformative along
a single dimension. Combining observations across the Series 3 and 4 conditions, in 98% of obser-
vations recommendations were informative along both dimensions. Thus, expert recommendations
are informative; as expert recommendations are informative in more than 95% of observations.
Result 7: The distance between expert recommendations is less under the feedback information
environment.
Support: Designating the feedback condition, Series 3, as the treatment and the no-feedback
condition, Series 4, as the control, we estimate the average treatment effect on the distance between
expert recommendations. When performing an exact match on the realized state values for periods
1-10, the average treatment effect is -4.5 units with a standard error of -2.1 (t=-2.1). Thus, the
distance between recommendations is less under the feedback information environment relative to
the no-feedback environment.
Result 8: The expected payoffs to both experts are lower when the Euclidean distance between
recommendations is greater than 21 units.
Support: Let M be the Euclidean distance between expert recommendations. Given dyadic
preferences there is a unique decision, the median voter’s ideal point, which results in the same
payoff to both experts. For any other decision, one expert receives a higher payoff. Analyzing
expert period payoffs, under the Series 3 condition the average payoffs for both the highest- and
lowest-paid experts are significantly lower in periods where M>21 (t=2.0 and t=2.9). Similarly, in the
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Series 4 condition the average payoffs for both the highest- and lowest-paid experts was significantly
lower in periods where M ≥ 21 (t=2.0 and t=2.1). Thus, we conclude that experts have incentives
to provide recommendations where the distance between the recommendations is not too great.
Further study is required to determine if this incentive follows from organized committee behavior
which punishes experts for untruthful recommendations or the committee randomly selecting a point
within constraints provided by the two recommendations.
4.7 Summary of Conclusions
Experimental results show that when operating under Robert’s Rules of Order the committee
decision reflects the information possessed by voting committee members. When committee members
are fully informed about their preferences the deliberation process results in a committee decision
that converges to the fully informed equilibrium (Result 1). When the committee only possesses
knowledge over the distributions of random state variables, the committee decision converges to the
unique equilibrium that exists when committee members act as expected utility maximizers (Result
2).
If a committee relies on information from biased experts with dyadic preferences, then procedures
that resemble Robert’s Rules of Order transfer information from experts to an otherwise uninformed
committee (Result 3). If specific rules and procedures allow committee members to assess the
sincerity of an expert’s past recommendation, then information revelation under Robert’s Rules of
Order is significantly higher (Result 4). When the committee assesses the sincerity of an expert’s
past recommendation, the committee decision reflects more information as expert recommendations
under the feedback environment contain more information (Result 7). We infer from these results
that procedures which develop expert reputations lead to greater information revelation.
Expert recommendations do not reveal the experts’ true preferences (Result 5), but nevertheless
committee members are able to extract information from the experts’ recommendations. While
experts are willing to manipulate the committee and try to do so, we hypothesize that dyadic
competition reduces the reward to such actions resulting in the transmission of information to
committee members (Result 8).
The process of expert testimony and policy recommendations in a committee setting stimulates
many questions. How does information get to the committee members and what is the role of the
procedures and institutions in promoting the phenomenon? While experts do not fully reveal their
private information, experts do transmit information as recommendations are not uninformative
(Result 6). We hypothesize that unrealistic exaggerations of expert preferences will be recognized
by the committee members and indeed, when the recommendations become too divergent the experts
themselves suffer (Result 8).
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The process of information revelation would seem to be related to the structure of expert pref-
erences. Indeed the process was designed with the anticipation that information revelation would
be fostered, with hints taken from existing committee designs. First, the use of two experts with
preferences known to be different from those of the committee members facilitates “triangulation”
by committee members on the true nature of what the experts know. The fact that experts are in a
zero-sum, or dyadic competition relationship with respect to the fully informed equilibrium is simi-
lar to that used in court proceedings where the interests of litigants present diametrically opposed
information to the court. Furthermore, use of only two experts with dyadic preferences relative to
the fully informed equilibrium restricts the formation of coalitions and coordinated efforts to ma-
nipulate the committee. Experts were prevented from posturing based on the recommendation of
the other’s recommendation as experts committed to their recommendation without knowing the
recommendation of the other expert. The experts did not vote and were thus limited in using the
process itself as a tool for manipulation.
Can we design better processes? Our results seem to only touch on the deep and challenging
task of designing deliberation processes that better merge conflict over outcome with the process of
information gathering and revelation. We demonstrate that information revelation in committees
is possible under procedures similar to Robert’s Rules of Order in the presence of conflict and will-
ingness to manipulate. We suggest that the ability of committees to operate in such environments
is closely related to the procedures they employ, and find that the development of expert reputa-
tions may be crucial to information revelation. As we continue to explore natural and theoretical
committee processes, we hope to gain insights about how to design even better procedures.
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Chapter 5
Donation by Association
5.1 Candidate Fundraising Decision
Scarce resources limit a candidate’s ability to deliver their message to the public. In the event a
candidate obtains the public’s ear, the candidate should consider the setting that will best suit their
immediate and long-term objectives. Consider the situation where a candidate has the option to
give a speech at either a press conference or a local charity event. The question posed in this article
is where should the candidate give their speech in order to raise the most money from individual
contributors? To answer this question two hypotheses are proposed and tested. The first hypothesis
proposes that a candidate can use associations with charity organizations to increase campaign con-
tributions. A principle assumption of this hypothesis is that a candidate’s association with a charity
organization conveys information to individuals, and that this information is relevant to campaign
contribution decisions. The second hypothesis posits that the effect of candidate association on
campaign contributions is not uniform across all charities. That is varying a candidate’s charity
associations may result in the candidate targeting different sub-groups of the population. These hy-
potheses are considered in the context of individuals possessing low levels of candidate information
and candidates choosing to associate with nonpartisan humanitarian and medical charities.1
While this article is silent as to why individuals contribute to candidates, the research literature
provides a variety of motivations for individual campaign contributions. One theory suggests that
political contributions are a form of investment where contributions are given in return for favorable
policy (Denzau and Munger 1986; Baron 1989; Grossman and Helpman 1994). A second theory sug-
gests that political contributions are a form of consumption good (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and
Snyder 2003). A third result finds that individuals tend to donate to friends and family (Thielemann
1993). Despite the variance in possible motivations, the literature generally agrees that resources
1In this paper, humanitarian charities are defined as organizations that assist destitute or underprivileged individ-
uals such as the Red Cross or Feed the Children. Medical charities are defined as medical research charities such as
the Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation and the American Cancer Society.
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largely explain individual campaign contributions (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Brady, Verba, and
Schlozman 1995).
To date the principle finding of the resource approach to campaign contributions is that people
who have money tend to contribute to political candidates (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie 1993;
Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Shields and Goidel 2000). Recognizing that having money is
essential to contributing, the resource approach is at best unsatisfying as no attempt is made to
explain “how cash in a person’s pocket is transformed into political contributions” (Llewellyn 2008).
Additionally, if possession of certain types of information increases the likelihood of contributing,
then a positive correlation between income and information will overestimate the importance of
wealth in explaining campaign contributions. While not modeled in the resource approach, it is
reasonable to assume that information plays an important role in transforming cash into candidate
contributions. Prior to contributing, an individual must know the candidate’s name, where to con-
tribute, and perhaps basic policy positions of the candidate. By incorporating information into the
decision process, this paper seeks to answer the question of how cash is transformed into contribu-
tions and significantly alter the manner in which the literature views political contributions. In this
article, individuals obtain information about a candidate by observing a candidate’s relationship
with nonpartisan, nonprofit charity organizations.
How a candidate’s association with a charity organization translates into individuals receiving
political information is perhaps best understood in the context of a social network. An individual’s
social network is a structure of relations through which social capital and information relevant to
the political process are obtained (Coleman 1987, 1988; Fukuyama 1995; Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton,
and Levine 1995; Putnam 1995; La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998). Because social capital and
information are acquired through social networks, rates of political participation are often thought to
be partially explained by an individual’s social network (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Putnam 2000;
Beck, Dalton, Greene, and Huckfeldt 2002). To date the study of social networks tends to focus on
the impact of person-to-person interactions on public opinion, political decisions, and participation
(Thielemann 1993; Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, and Levine 1995; Huckfeldt, Levine, Morgan, and
Sprague 1998; La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Beck, Dalton, Greene, and Huckfeldt 2002; Sinclair
2007).
Despite a focus on person-to-person interactions, it is clear that individuals receive political in-
formation by observing candidate relationships with political and social organizations. For instance,
voters use party identification to infer candidate ideology and governing behavior (Campbell et al.
1960; Converse 1975; Bartels 2000; Ray 2003). Through information campaigns and spokespeople,
social organizations routinely try to influence public opinion. A social organization’s position on
a policy or support of a candidate have been found to significantly affect participation and the
development of voter preferences (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie 1993; Lupia 1994; Lupia and
63
McCubbins 1998; Forehand, Gastil, and Smith 2004). This article borrows from the social network
literature the hypothesis that the juxtaposition of candidates and organizations, specifically charity
organizations, can affect an individual’s decision to contribute to a candidate by altering the in-
dividual’s information and beliefs over the candidate. While this article does not directly test the
type and amount of information candidate association may convey, it is assumed that a candidate’s
association with nonpartisan charity organizations conveys information over valence attributes such
as kindness, generosity, and civic participation.
In a new approach to understanding individual campaign contributions in American elections, the
primary hypothesis proposes that candidates can utilize charity organizations to increase political
contributions. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that candidate association with charity
organizations conveys information about the candidate and this information is relevant to campaign
contribution decisions. Survey experiments are used to test this hypothesis when participants pos-
sess low levels of candidate information and receive messages about a candidate’s association with
nonpartisan, nonprofit charities. Following empirical analysis of the primary hypothesis, regression
analysis is used to test the second hypothesis that the effect of association on campaign contributions
is not uniform across all charities. The following section describes the experimental design, treat-
ments, and method of treatment assignment. Section 3 is a discussion of the survey methodology
used to collect the data. Section 4 is a descriptive analysis of the data. Sections 5 and 6 present
empirical tests of the primary hypothesis that candidate association with social organizations affects
candidate contributions. Regression models are estimated and analyzed in Section 7 to test the
second hypothesis that the effect of association varies by organization. Finally, Section 8 discusses
the implications of these results on candidate, voter, and social organization behavior.
5.2 Experiment and Treatments
A survey experiment was used to test the hypotheses regarding candidate association with charity
organizations. Survey respondents were randomly assigned to either the control group or one of two
treatment groups: humanitarian or medical. Of the 1,000 respondents assigned to the experiment,
half were placed in the control group which simulates the situation where the candidate has no stated
or known associations. The remaining observations were evenly divided between the humanitarian
and medical treatments. Following assignment to a control or treatment group respondents were
given the opportunity to opt out of the experiment. This choice was given in an effort to reduce bias
that may arise from careless participation. Given individuals had the opportunity to decline partic-
ipating in the experiment, participation rates are under 100%, the implications of low participation
are discussed in greater detail in Section 5.4.
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The information provided to experiment participants varied by group assignment. All control
and treatment groups received a message containing information about a candidate running for
office with details of the candidate’s speech and policy positions. Information about the candidate’s
political affiliation and platform was uniform across all groups. Members of the humanitarian and
control treatments received an additional message regarding the location of the candidate’s speech.
The control group did not receive this additional message and only knew the details of a candidate’s
speech and political identification. The wording of the message to the control group was:
“Now I would like you to consider a congressional race involving independent candidate Robert
Hunt. Congressional candidate Robert Hunt recently gave a speech highlighting his promises to
get tough on political corruption, improve the educational system, and reduce crime.”
Observations belonging to the humanitarian and medical treatments received an additional mes-
sage that the candidate gave the speech to either a humanitarian or medical charity organization.
The wording of the message in the humanitarian and medical treatment was:
“Now I would like you to consider a congressional race involving independent candidate Robert
Hunt. Congressional candidate Robert Hunt recently attended a charity event that raised money
for humanitarian relief efforts (for cancer research). At the charity event candidate Robert
Hunt gave a speech highlighting his promises to get tough on political corruption, improve the
educational system, and reduce crime. ”
Following the message participants were asked, “If you were asked by Robert Hunt’s campaign
for a financial contribution what is the percent chance (or what are the chances out of 100) that
you would make a financial contribution to Robert Hunt’s campaign?” Participants entered their
response with an integer between 0 and 100 in a text box; this response is the dependent variable in
the following analysis.2 The next two sections discuss the method of data collection and descriptive
results.
5.3 Data
The survey data comes from the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES); a
panel survey comprised of a pre- and post-election questionnaire that covers the November 2008
U.S. election. The objective of the 2008 CCES is to study and understand American views over
Congress and Congressional representatives. The data presented in this article is taken from the
pre-election survey which was fielded over the Internet during October 2008.
2This article focuses on the likelihood of contributing for two primary reasons: (1) the relatively low ceilings on
individual campaign contributions significantly reduces the variability in individual campaign contributions and (2)
increasing likelihoods of contributing may correspond to larger donations as it may be reasonable to expect that
ceteras paribus individuals who are willing to give larger contributions will most likely report a higher likelihood of
contributing.
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The 2008 pre-election CCES survey contains both a common content portion and individual
research team content. The common content is asked of all 32,800 respondents and covers questions
on socio-economic characteristics, political opinion, and political behavior. In addition to the com-
mon content portion, each pre-election survey contained a second set of questions submitted by one
research team. The 2008 CCES is comprised of 30 American and European research teams with
members at more than 34 research institutions. Each research team developed a set of questions
which was asked of approximately 1,000 participants. The data presented in this article is from
questions placed on the Caltech module, which is a 1,000 person nationally representative sample.
The sample frame or target population was constructed via sampling of the American Com-
munity Survey (ACS) and contains data on most socio-economic and political variables: age, race,
gender, education, income, employment, party identification, etc. The 2008 CCES target population
selected from the American Community Survey is a true probability sample and representative of
the American population. Following completion of the CCES survey, respondents were matched to
individuals in the target population based on a distance metric that paired observations with similar
socio-economic and political characteristics. The goal of the matching algorithm was to pair an indi-
vidual in the target population to the most similar survey respondent. The matched cases were then
weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. A nationally representative sample of US
adults was created via sample matching on registered and unregistered voters and using appropriate
sample weights. Comparison of national and state election results with the weighted 2008 CCES
data provides evidence that the sampling and weighting methodology produce valid national- and
state-level results.3
5.4 Descriptive Results
Table 5.1 presents the breakdown of participation rates and observations by treatment. Recall
that survey respondents were given the opportunity to opt out of the experiment, and thus partic-
ipation rates are less than 100%. Analyzing the participation rates found in Table Table 5.1, it is
evident that the participation rates are fairly consistent between the treatments and control group.
Among the control group the participation rate was 51% and a total of 243 individuals declined
to participate in the experiment. Out of a possible 250 participants the humanitarian treatment
has 137 participants for a participation rate of 54%. Finally, out of a possible 250 participants the
medical treatment has 123 participants for a participation rate of 49%. The greatest difference in
participation is between the humanitarian and medical treatments which indicates differences may
exist between the groups in the underlying distribution of socio-economic characteristics.
3For more information on the sampling and weighting methodology of the 2008 CCES
see “Guide to the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study” (Ansolabehere 2008) at
http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl/cces/material/CCES Guide 2008 Rough Draft v2.pdf.
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Table 5.1: Participation & Observations
Control Humanitarian Medical
Participation rate 51% 54% 49%
Total Observations 257 137 123
The primary variable of interest is a participant’s likelihood of contributing to the candidate
Robert Hunt (likelihood of contributing). When asking respondents in a survey their likelihood
of contributing to a political candidate, one concern is that survey results may overestimate the
likelihood of this event. For instance, it is possible that respondents will report being far more likely
to contribute relative to their actual behavior. While a valid concern, a look at the data shows
that this is not the case. In total 35% of experiment participants reported donating money to one
or more political campaigns in 2008. In comparison, when averaging across all groups, the average
likelihood of contributing to the candidate Robert Hunt is 18%.
Another validity check on responses is to examine if there exists a relationship between political
interest and contributions to the candidate. The data would appear fundamentally flawed if a
participant with a low level of political interest reports a high likelihood of contributing to the
candidate. Thus, it is expected that low levels of political interest will coincide with a low likelihood
of contributing. Analyzing the data, the average probability of a political contribution from a
respondent who self-identifies as “not very interested in politics” is just 2.2%. In other words,
individuals who report low levels of interest in politics report a very low likelihood of contributing
to the candidate.
Table 5.2 and Figures 5.1–5.3 present sample statistics and histograms for the likelihood of
contributing by group assignment. A review of the data shows that across all groups the center of
mass for the likelihood of contributing is relatively low. The interpretation of the data presented in
these figures is that on average participants are not very likely to make a political contribution to
the treatment candidates. Relative to both the humanitarian and medical treatments, the likelihood
of contributing for individuals assigned to the control group is skewed slightly more toward the left;
implying members of the control have a lower likelihood of contributing. Comparing both the 95%
confidence interveals and the histograms for the likelihood of contributing in the humanitarian and
medical treatments it is apparent that these two distributions are approximately equal. Finally,
the mean likelihood of contributing for both the humanitarian and medical treatments is equivalent
(t=0.36).
The primary explanation for individual political contributions is that people who have money
make political contributions (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). Figure 5.4 presents a plot of
income and political contributions where lighter shades correspond to a greater concentration of
observations. Analyzing Figure 5.4 it is apparent that the greatest density of observations is for a
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Table 5.2: Likelihood of Contributing by Assignment
Control Humanitarian Medical
Group Treatment Treatment
Sample average 14.1 21.6 22.9
Standard error 23.8 29.3 31.5
95% Confidence Interval 11.2 - 17.0 16.6 - 26.5 17.3 - 28.5
Likelihood of political contribution
D
en
si
ty
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
Figure 5.1: Likelihood of Contributing Control Group
Likelihood of political contribution
D
en
si
ty
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
Figure 5.2: Likelihood of Contributing Humanitarian Treatment
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Figure 5.3: Likelihood of Contributing Medical Treatment
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Figure 5.4: Likelihood of Contribution by Income
low likelihood of contributing and an income level between $40,00-80,000. The solid line through
Figure 5.4 plots the regression of the likelihood of contributing on income and the dotted line plots
the locally weighted regression line. Similar to previous studies of political contributions, the slope
of the regression line indicates a positive relationship between income and contributions. However,
analyzing the slope in the locally weighted least-squares regression of income on contributing, it
is clear that for most individuals the slope of the regression line is near zero. Only for families
earning over $100,000 does the locally weighted regression possess a consistent and positive slope.
Thus, it appears that high income individuals, who comprise a small fraction of the population, are
driving the strong linear relationship between income and contributions. This result suggests that
in a multivariate analysis the appropriate model specification may incorporate a nonlinear income
effect.
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Figure 5.5: Likelihood of Contribution by Charitable Donations
One might expect that in a model of candidate association with charity organizations a positive
relationship will exist between charitable donations and the likelihood of contributing. One justi-
fication for this expectation is that charitable contributions and income are positively correlated
(ρ=.29). As shown above, for high levels of income there is a positive relationship between income
and political contributions. Second, individuals with greater ties to the charity organization may
infer greater amounts of positive information from candidate association. Figure 5.5 is a plot of
charitable donations and political contributions where lighter shades correspond to a greater con-
centration of observations. The data in Figure 5.5 is fairly well distributed along the x-axis as more
than two-thirds of participants report making charitable donations in 2008. The solid line in Figure
5.5 plots the regression line for the likelihood of a political contribution on charitable donations and
the dotted line plots the locally weighted regression for these two variables. While somewhat flat
in places, the slope of the locally weighted least-squares regression line is generally increasing and
indicates that charitable donations have a positive effect on contributions.
Finally, it is reasonable to expect that the humanitarian and medical treatments will have the
biggest effect on individuals who donate large sums of money to charity. That is a candidate’s
identification with a charity organization is likely to have the greatest positive effect on the members
and individuals who identify with charity organizations. Figure 5.6 contains plots of the mean and
standard errors for the likelihood of a political contribution by the amount of charitable donations
and group assignment.
Analyzing the control group first, total charitable donations of $50 or less appear to have little
effect on the mean likelihood of contributing, while donations exceeding $75 appear to have a positive
and significant effect on the likelihood of a contribution. Similarly, for individuals assigned the
humanitarian treatment charitable donations of $50 or less appear to have little effect on the mean
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Figure 5.6: Likelihood of Contributing by Charitable Donations and Group
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likelihood of contributing. Comparing observations within the humanitarian treatment, individuals
donating $75 or more are on average more than three times as likely to make a political contribution.
Relative to the control group, the likelihood of contributing for individuals who make large charitable
donations is roughly 10 points higher in the humanitarian group.
The bottom-left panel of Figure 5.6 plots the average likelihood of a political contribution by
total charitable donations for the medical treatment. The difference between the medical treatment
relative to both the control and humanitarian treatments is at once evident. The medical treatment
appears to increase the likelihood of contributing for individuals who make little or no charitable do-
nations. Relative to both the control and humanitarian groups the average likelihood of contributing
for individuals who donate $50 or less to charity is approximately 10 points higher in the medical
treatment. This variance in treatment effects, as depicted in Figure 5.6, is discussed in greater detail
in Section 7. However, simple descriptive results suggest that candidates may need to consider their
target population when choosing between speaking engagements.
Descriptive results and figures indicate that in general the data match intuitive expectations.
Individuals do not report overwhelming probabilities of contributing and there are positive relation-
ships between political contributions and covariates such as political interest, income, and charitable
donations. Finally, Figure 5.6 suggests that group assignment may alter the relationship between
charitable donations and political contributions. To better understand how candidate association
with charity organizations affect campaign contributions, the next section estimates naive estimates
of the average treatment effect.
5.5 Naive Estimate of the Treatment Effect
The power and popularity of a randomized experiment is due to the straightforward compu-
tation of the average treatment effect (ATE). The ease of calculating the ATE in a randomized
experiment is that the researcher does not need to consider socio-economic or other explanatory co-
variates. When group assignment is random and participation approaches 100%, then the net result
of possible confounding covariates is offset by the randomization process. Let Yi be i’s likelihood of
contributing, Zi designate group assignment, and k={humanitarian, medical}, then the naive ATE
is:
Naive ATEk = 1Nk
∑
i Yi(Zi = k)− 1Ncontrol
∑
i Yi(Zi = control).
The above equation states that in a randomized experiment with full participation the ATE for
treatment k is simply the difference between the sample means. Table 5.3 presents the estimates for
the naive ATE for the humanitarian and medical treatments. Based on the results in Table 5.3, the
estimated naive treatment effects for the humanitarian and medical treatments are a positive and
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Table 5.3: Naive Average Treatment Effect
Humanitarian Medical
Treatment Treatment
Naive ATE 7.5 8.8
Standard error (2.9) (3.2)
t statistic 2.6 2.8
95% Confidence Interval 1.7 - 13.2 2.5 - 15.1
significant 7.5 and 8.8 points. Thus, if only presented data from these sample averages, a politician
would conclude that association with either a humanitarian or medical charity organization will
significantly increase the likelihood of contributing.
Given participants had the opportunity to self-select out of the experiment and response rates
well under 100%, random group assignment may not result in groups possessing similar underlying
distributions of socio-economic characteristics. Specifically, if the treatment significantly alters the
likelihood of respondent participation based upon income, political interest, or charitable donations,
then the resulting estimate of the naive ATE may be biased. Analyzing the data, significant differ-
ences between the control and treatments are found to exist in the means of the distributions for
charitable donations and political ideology. This suggests that the failure to treat is correlated with
an individual’s likelihood of contributing, and a better measure of the treatment effect is the average
treatment effect for the treated (ATT). The ATT is derived:
ATTk = 1Nk
∑
i Yi(Zi = k)− 1Nk
∑
i Yi(Zi = control | Zi = k).
In the equation above, the first term is the observed likelihood of contributing for members of the
humanitarian and medical treatments. However, the second term is the counter factual statement,
“How would a member of the humanitarian or medical treatment behave if she were placed in the
control?”. This second term is unobserved and is estimated by matching an observation from the
treatment with an observation(s) from the control. The next section describes the method used
to match treatment and control observations in order to estimate the counter factual statement
contained in the ATT. Following a discussion of the matching results, the treatment effects are
re-estimated using the matched data.
5.6 Estimating Treatment Effects via Matching
To prevent careless participation, participants had the option to opt out of the experiment which
resulted in differences between the control and treatment groups in the distribution of charitable
donations and other socio-economic variables. Given theoretical and descriptive results suggest-
ing charitable donations and socio-economic variables are correlated with candidate contributions,
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matching algorithms are used to correct for the potential bias found in the estimate of the naive
ATE. In this section matching algorithms are used to pair each observation from the humanitar-
ian and medical treatments to two observations from the control group based on socio-economic,
charitable donation, and political characteristics. Using these matched pairs, it is possible to esti-
mate the counter factual statement E(Yi(Zi = 0 | Zi = k)) where k={humanitarian, medical}, and
subsequently estimate the ATT.4
Using the MatchIt program in the statistical package R, a genetic matching algorithm was used
to match individuals based on their propensity of participating in either the control or treatments.5
Two sets of propensity scores were estimated. One set of propensity scores was estimated for the
control and humanitarian group observations. A second set of estimates was derived for the control
and medical group observations. To derive the propensity score, a logistic regression was estimated
where the dependent variable was zero if the observation participated in the control group or one
if the observation participated in the humanitarian (medical) group. The independent variables
in this regression were gender, family income, political interest, age, charitable donations, 2008
political donations, and political ideology. The propensity score is the logistic model estimate of the
probability that an observation was in the treatment group. Each observation in the humanitarian
and medical treatments was matched to the two observations from the control group with the most
similar propensity score. Balance was achieved on the above covariates; balance is achieved if the
means and variances of the underlying characteristics are not significantly different.
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 display the estimated propensity scores for the treated and control groups.
A dark observation indicates that the control observation was matched to an observation in the
corresponding treatment group. A light or clear observation in the control group indicates that this
observation was not matched to a corresponding observation in the treated group. Unless specifically
stated, unmatched control observations are not included in subsequent calculations.
Analyzing the distributions of the propensity scores found in Figures 5.7 and 5.8 it is evident that
the control group has greater mass on lower propensity scores. The interpretation of this finding
is that individuals with lower incomes, lower political interest, and lower charitable donations are
more likely to participate in the control treatment relative to either the humanitarian or medical
treatments. Assuming a positive relationship between these variables and political contributions,
the estimate of the naive ATE is likely to overestimate the true ATE. By matching observations with
similar propensity scores and eliminating unmatched observations, the likelihood of participation for
the control and treated groups are held constant for characteristics such as income and charitable
donations.
4For greater discussion of causal inference and estimating counter factuals see Morgan and Winship (2007). For
discussion and application of matching algorithms in estimating treatment effects see Imai (2005).
5The genetic matching algorithm uses an evolutionary search algorithm to determine the weight assigned to each
covariate in an effort to achieve balance on all specified covariates (Diamond and Sekhon 2005). For more information
on matching algorithms in R see Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart (2007, 2007b).
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Figure 5.7: Humanitarian Treatment
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Figure 5.8: Medical Treatment
Table 5.4 presents the estimated ATT and ATE for the matched samples. When using matching
to correct for group differences in charitable donations, income, and political ideology, estimates
of the ATT and ATE indicate that candidates can affect political behavior through association
with charity organizations. However, the success of these attempts is conditional upon the charity
organization. By providing information that the candidate is associated with a medical charity,
candidates may significantly increase the likelihood of a political contribution by 6.5 points (t=2.4).
On the other hand, association with a humanitarian organization does not have a significant effect
on the probability of a political contribution.
The above results focus on the effect among all observations within a group and do not account
for possible differences in the treatment effect by charitable donations. As seen above in Figure 5.6,
differences in the treatment effect appear to exist based on an individual’s charitable donations. The
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Table 5.4: Estimated Treatment Effects Under Matching
Humanitarian Medical
Control Treated Control Treated
Total 257 137 257 123
Matched 173 137 162 123
Unmatched 84 0 95 0
Estimated ATT 3.2 6.5
standard error (2.1) (2.0)
t statistic 1.5 3.3
95% Confidence Interval (-)0.8 - 7.0 2.7 - 10.6
Estimated ATE 3.0 5.7
standard error (2.2) (2.4)
t statistic 1.4 2.4
95% Confidence Interval (-)1.2 - 7.0 1.0 - 10.4
next section uses regression analysis to analyze the hypothesis that the affect of association may
vary between charity organizations.
5.7 Regression Analysis
Recall that one interpretation of Figure 5.6 is that candidates who associate with humanitarian
groups are more likely to receive contributions from individuals who donate large sums of money to
humanitarian charities. On the other hand, Figure 5.6 also suggests that candidate association with
medical charities may affect the intercept term. Regression analysis is used in this section to test
these descriptive results through the use of a more rigorous analysis that controls for socio-economic
covariates and the differences in the distributions of the underlying covariates. This section presents
two regressions models, the first of which demonstrates that the data behaves properly and within
expectations developed by the resource approach to campaign contributions. The second regression,
Model 2, analyzes the second hypothesis that the subset of individuals who are more likely to
contribute may differ as a candidate chooses to associate with different charity organizations.
The second hypothesis is analyzed through a regression model that estimates differences in the
treatment effects by combining observations from the humanitarian and medical treatments into
a single regression; where the dependent variable is an individual’s likelihood of contributing. An
earlier analysis showed that in order to properly analyze and interpret the data, it was necessary
to control for differences between groups in the distributions of income and charitable donations.
When comparing the humanitarian and medical treatments, the mean charitable donation was signif-
icantly higher and the mean political ideology was significantly lower for the humanitarian treatment
(t=2.65, t=2.07). Using the genetic algorithm in the MATCHIT program, a matching algorithm
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was run to develop individual weights that will reduce differences in the distributions of covariates
between the humanitarian and medical treatments. Individuals belonging to the humanitarian and
medical treatments were matched along the following characteristics: education, age, income, family
size, political ideology, party identification, 2008 donation behavior, and charitable contributions.
The resulting matching algorithm successfully matched all individuals in both treatments and pro-
duced an individual weight for each observation; where each medical treatment observation was
matched to two humanitarian treatment observations. When analyzing the weighted data, using the
individual weights computed by the matching algorithm, the significant differences in the parameters
of the underlying covariates were eliminated. In the subsequent regression analysis, the individual
observations are weighted according to the weights generated by the matching algorithm.6
Turning attention to the regressions, Model 1, is a standard model of individual political contri-
butions. The independent variables included in Model 1 are common to past studies of campaign
contributions; such as income, age, education, political identification, and political interest.7 Based
on the results of similar models explaining campaign contributions, it is expected that both income
and political interest will exert a positive and significant effect in Model 1.
The estimates for the coefficients included in Model 1 are presented in Table 5.5. The results of
the first model suggest that a basic regression of the likelihood of contributing on socio-economic
variables produces similar results to that found in the resource literature. Specifically, the estimated
coefficient for income and age are significant and positive. The significance of the estimated coeffi-
cient for income in Model 1 suggests that the data appear reasonable and comparable to previous
analyses. However, the low value of the adjusted R2 in Model 1 suggests that a purely socio-
economic explanation does not adequately model campaign contributions when candidates associate
with charity organizations.
The second column in Table 5.5 presents the estimates for the coefficients in Model 2. In addition
to the variables included in the first model, Model 2 estimates coefficients for the independent
variables medical, charitable donations - humanitarian, and charitable donations - medical. The
variable medical captures any shift in the intercept that occurs from an individual receiving the
medical treatment relative to the humanitarian treatment. Given estimates of the average treatment
effect that suggest the effect of the medical treatment on the likelihood of contributing is greater
for the medical treatment, it is expected that the coefficient for medical will be positive. Finally,
it was suggested earlier that individuals who donate large sums of money to charity may be more
likely to contribute to candidates who associate with charity organizations. The two variables
charitable donations - humanitarian and charitable donations -medical measure how much money
6This ensures that the underlying covariate distributions possess similar means and variances.
7Given descriptive results that suggest a nonlinear relationship between income and contributions, the regression
models are estimated with a squared income coefficient on the right-hand side. Alternative specifications which
incorporate a linear income term do not produce significantly different results, but are a poorer fit to the data.
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Table 5.5: Models of Political Contributions
Model 1 Model 2
age 0.36 0.29
(.12) (.13)
education -2.57 -2.96
(1.32) (1.26)
income squaredd 0.57 .45
(.25) (.26)
political interest 3.39 3.67
(3.09) (2.99)
political ideology 0.01 0.02
(.10) (.10)
charitable donations - humanitarian - .20
- (.06)
charitable donations - medical - .01
- (.07)
medical - 14.2
- (4.88)
intercept 16.0 12.0
(10.30) (9.67)
observations 260 260
log likelihood
adjusted R2 .08 .17
a. Coefficients in bold are significant at the 95% confidence level, p ≤.05
b. Variables included in the regression and excluded from the table:
gender, married, kids, party strength, and party identification.
c. Excluded variables did not have a significant effect in any model.
d. In millions
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an individual in either treatment donated to charity; the variable takes a value of zero if the individual
did not belong to that treatment. If individuals who donate large sums of money are more likely
to contribute to a candidate who associates with charity organizations, then one or both of the
coefficients for charitable donations will be positive and significant.
Recall that the second hypothesis posits that the effect of candidate association, that is who is
more likely to contribute, is not uniform across all charity organizations. The results of Model 2
support the second hypothesis as regression results show that humanitarian and medical association
have distinct and separate effects on who contributes. First, the interpretation for the positive and
significant coefficient on charitable donations - humanitarian is that individuals who donate large
sums of money to charity are more likely to contribute to a candidate who associates with a hu-
manitarian charity. Second, the insignificant coefficient on charitable donations - medical suggests
that the amount of an individual’s charitable donations has no effect on the likelihood of a cam-
paign contribution when the candidate associates with medical charities. Finally, the positive and
significant coefficient on the variable medical suggests that all individuals, regardless of income, age,
charitable donations, or political ideology, are significantly more likely to contribute to a candidate
who associates with a medical charity.
The regression results in Model 2 imply that the effect of candidate association with social
organizations varies between organizations and has a highly nuanced effect on political contributions.
First, the positive and significant estimate for the coefficient medical implies that the likelihood of
a contribution for a candidate associated with a medical charity organization is largely independent
of income and charitable donations. However, for candidate’s associating with humanitarian groups
the probability of a contribution is significantly and positively tied to the charitable donations of
the individual. These results suggest that candidates should be aware of their support base, and
should choose associations depending upon whether they are targeting broad-based populous or well
financed philanthropists.
5.8 Discussion
An implication of empirical studies of campaign contributions is that, short of increasing an
individual’s income, there is little candidates can do to increase individual political contributions.
In this article, the hypothesis is proposed that candidates can significantly increase individual cam-
paign contributions by becoming associated with charity organizations. This hypothesis is built
on the assumption that candidate association with a charity conveys information relevant to the
contribution process. A second hypothesis posits that the effect of association is not necessarily
uniform across all charity organizations. Tests of these hypotheses are performed in the context
of nonpartisan, nonprofit charities where candidates may associate with either a humanitarian or
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medical charity. The above hypotheses are tested through survey experiments in combination with
matching algorithms and regression analysis.
The primary conclusion is that candidate association with charity organizations can increase cam-
paign contributions. Results show that candidates who associate with medical charities significantly
increases the likelihood of campaign contributions. However, candidates must be careful in choosing
their associations as a candidate’s identification with a humanitarian charity is not found to have a
significant effect on the likelihood of contributing. Additionally, candidate association with different
charity organizations results in different subpopulations being more likely to contribute. The effect
of candidate association with medical charities is uniform across all socio-economic characteristics, in
particular an individual’s level of charitable donations. On the other hand, individuals who donate
large sums of money to charity are more likely to contribute to the candidate who associates with a
humanitarian charity relative to a medical charity.
The individual campaign contributions literature focuses upon the role of money, and fails to
consider how or why voter levels of information about a candidate may affect individual campaign
contributions. This article hypothesizes that candidate associations with social organizations con-
vey information about the candidate to individuals, and that this information is relevant to an
individuals decision to contribute. Experimental results support this hypothesis as candidate as-
sociation with medical charities is found to significantly increase campaign contributions. These
results are important as they suggest that contrary to the implications of the resource approach,
candidate strategies exist that may increase political contributions and the best strategy may be
contingent upon the candidate’s target population. Candidates seeking a broad base of support
are better suited to associate with medical charities. However, candidates seeking campaign funds
from wealthy philanthropists may find it beneficial to seek speaking engagements with humanitarian
charities.
Perhaps raising more questions than it answers, the finding that social institutions and organi-
zations affect political contributions is another step in better understanding the interaction of social
institutions and political behavior. Additional research is needed to understand why candidate iden-
tification with some charities results in popular and uniform support, while others appear to channel
a specific and wealthy subpopulation. Another open question raised in this article is what form and
how much information does candidate association with social organizations provide? While empiri-
cal results imply voters receive additional information from candidate association, greater study is
needed to understand the type and nature of this information. In the experiments above, care was
taken to consider nonpartisan, nonprofit charities. It may be interesting to study the simultaneous
effect of partisan social organizations on contributions and turnout.
If political contributions are tied to political access, then the results of the resource approach to
campaign contributions present dire predictions for representative government. Given that income
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inequalities exist, this article presents an alternative and perhaps optimistic view of campaign con-
tributions. Through a solely selfish desire to increase political contributions, candidates may break,
or at least weaken, the hypothesized link between income and political contributions by associating
with social organizations.
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Chapter 6
Cost and Rules: Candidate
Behavior in Presidential Primaries
6.1 Introduction
Empirical studies of candidate policy positions find that candidate platforms do not converge at
the U.S. presidential or Congressional levels (Page 1978; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Erikson andWright
1989; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 1998; King 1999). While scholarly research has identified
numerous explanations for candidate divergence in two-candidate races, researchers persistently find
that, regardless of the electoral institution, multicandidate races are a centrifugal force on candidate
platforms (Coleman 1971; Aranson and Ordeshook 1972; Palfrey 1984; Adams 1999, 2000; Schofield
2004; Schofield and Sened 2005; Adams and Merrill 2006; Owen and Grofman 2006).1 Because
candidate positions are responsive to the sequential nature of an election (Aldrich 1980a), primary
rules that quickly narrow the field of candidates may be successful in reducing or eliminating the
centrifugal force of a multicandidate race. In the context of United States presidential elections,
research generally overlooks the effect of rules on candidate exit decisions. This article attempts
to partially fill this gap by modeling a two-stage sequential primary followed by a general election
where candidates have the option to exit after the first primary.
Since the 1980s, there has been little progress made in explaining the process by which U.S.
presidential candidates are winnowed: the dynamics through which potential nominees are elimi-
nated. Typically winnowing is considered the result of a feedback loop between election outcomes
and fundraising or media coverage. Unable to raise either cash or the media’s attention, losing
candidates are forced to exit the nomination process (Aldrich 1980a, 1980b). Formal models of
candidate winnowing depict candidates locked in a war of attrition, but ignore the implications of
1See Black (1948) or Downs (1957) for the definition and intuition of the median voter theorem. Recent research
by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Groseclose (2001), and Aragones and Palfrey (2002) suggests that candidate
divergence in two-candidate races is the result of differences in candidate quality. See Fiorina (1999) for a discussion
of the theories that lead to a breakdown in the median voter theorem.
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winnowing on candidate platforms (Strumpf 2002). Research on the dynamics of winnowing tends
to focus upon the elimination of candidates within subgroups of the Democratic and Republican
parties; such as the emergence of one candidate from among all extreme Democratic candidates
(Brams 1978; Shafer 1988; Kessel 1992). However, given multiple partisan subgroups the emergence
of one candidate from each subgroup does not eliminate the centrifugal force of a multicandidate
election.
Empirical research finds that candidates voluntarily exit the nomination contest when a candi-
date’s electoral prospects fall below a minimal threshold (Norrander 2000). Building on this basic
relationship between electoral prospects and candidate exit decisions, this article assumes that can-
didates with poor electoral prospects will be unwilling to pay a large cost to keep their nomination
hopes alive. Under this assumption, a model is developed where primary rules and institutions
require candidates to pay a cost to enter later primaries. The central question of this paper is, can a
cost to enter later primaries winnow the field of candidates in a predictable manner? After the exit of
within-party competition, the eventual party nominee is free to adopt a platform that maximizes the
probability of winning the general election during the remaining primaries. Adoption of moderate
platforms during the primaries is important, as research suggests that a candidate’s general election
platform is affected by their primary positions and actions (Burden 2001, 2004; Ezra 2004).
The model of costly sequential elections developed below is similar to the process used to select
the president of the United States. There are two parties where each party contains two office-
motivated candidates who compete in a two-stage party primary for their party’s nomination.2
After observing the results of the first primary all candidates must pay a fixed cost to compete in
the second primary or exit the race. It is important to note that this cost is not variable or in any
way tied to candidate effort. The cost candidates pay is a candidate’s unavoidable financial liability:
employing a campaign staff, raising campaign funds, moving the campaign staff to the next location,
filing federal election commission reports, and paying ballot access fees. Following the nomination,
the two party nominees face off in the general election. In general, there exist many equilibria where
because of the cost to continue candidates choose to exit following the first primary. This article
focuses upon the conditions in which there exists a cost and a unique equilibrium strategy profile
such that following the first primary losing candidates exit and winning candidates stay. Results
show that in a front-loaded primary calendar, there generally exists a cost and unique equilibrium
strategies such that after the first primary losing candidates exit and winning candidates stay in
the election. However, when most of the primaries take place late in the primary calendar, an
equilibrium where losing candidates exit and winning candidates stay is unique only when voters
derive little utility from candidate policy positions.
2Office-motivated politicians has been a common theoretical assumption, anecdotal observation, and empirical
finding dating back to Downs (1957) and Mayhew (1974).
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6.2 Sequential Elections and Candidate Competition
Research on voter behavior during presidential primaries tends to focus on divisive primaries
and momentum. The crux of the divisive primary argument is that during the general election
turnout suffers from a fiercely contested nomination battle (Lengle 1980; Kenney and Rice 1987).
Controlling for candidate quality and election context, Atkeson (1998; 2000) finds that the sign on
the effect of divisive primaries is correct but tends to be overstated. Research on how momentum
affects candidate behavior is rooted in empirical and experimental evidence that finds voters prefer
to support the winning candidate (Niemi and Bartels 1984; Bartels 1985; Abramowitz 1989; Bartels
1988; Herron 1998). Finally, theoretical work finds that bandwagons will form in equilibrium when
voters possess preferences over voting for the winning candidate (Callendar 2007).
The behavior of candidates, and subsequently voters, is affected by the sequential nature of the
primary process. Specifically, the amount and types of information candidates transmit to voters is
in part determined by the sequential nature of the presidential campaign. Downs (1957) hypothesizes
that the incentives for candidates to espouse clear positions during the campaign are clearly suspect.
However, primary debates have been found to be a source of voter information and have a significant
effect on voter perceptions of candidates (Yawn et al. 1998; Best and Hubbard 1999). Aldrich
(1980a) finds that candidates respond to these incentives during presidential primaries by altering
their message to adjust for the preferences of the electorate in the next primary. Finally, theoretical
results indicate that when candidates are uncertain over voter preferences, then a sequential election
may reveal voter preferences and candidates will adopt ambiguous positions early in an election
(Meirowitz 2005).3 The literature on the effect of momentum in presidential primaries focuses on
the twin effects of candidate expectations and resources. First, candidates who perform better
than expected gain momentum and candidates who underperform lose momentum (Aldrich 1980a,
1980b). Second, momentum and resources go hand in hand as momentum is key to obtaining
campaign contributions and media coverage, while candidates without momentum lose access to
these resources and are forced to drop out (Aldrich 1980a, 1980b; Gurian 1986).
Electoral rules and institutions affect candidate behavior (Norrander 2000), and ultimately plat-
form convergence (Cox 1990). Study of the rules of presidential nominations has analyzed the effect
of delegate allocation rules, such as winner-take-all and proportional rules on candidate behavior
(Geer 1986; Wattenberg 1991; Mayer 1996). Research suggests that the winner-take-all rule is not
only more responsive to voter preferences (Ansolabehere and King 1990), but provides an advan-
tage when the other party allocates delegates based upon voteshare or congressional district (Mayer
3On the other hand, some political scientists believe that when voters are risk adverse, campaigns will transmit
information, as voters are likely to punish vague policy statements on election day (Shepsle 1972; Alvarez 1997).
Testing these competing hypotheses, empirical research finds that at the start of a political campaign season voters
are relatively uninformed about specific candidate positions and attributes, but through candidate campaigns voters
gather relevant candidate information (Gelman and King 1993; Alvarez 1997).
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1996). Analysis of the rules and centrifugal forces of primary elections tends to focus on either the
sequential dynamic or voting behavior in open versus closed primaries (Coleman 1971; Aranson and
Ordeshook 1972; Gerber and Morton 1998; Grofman and Brunell 1997; Heckelman 2000; Kanthak
and Morton 2001; Owen and Grofman 2006). The sequential elections literature finds that when a
candidate’s platform is fixed prior to the final election, then primaries lead to divergent platforms
as a candidate becomes more extreme in an effort to secure the party nomination (Coleman 1971;
Aranson and Ordeshook 1972; Owen and Grofman 2006). In the context of Congressional primaries,
Gerber and Morton (1998) find that closed primary rules result in more extreme candidates relative
to semi-open primary rules.
Through changes in information, momentum, or rules, candidates may have incentives to adjust
their strategy during the campaign. However, research suggests that the ability of candidates to
adjust voter perceptions of their ideological platform is limited by cost (Page 1978; Ezra 2001) and
a candidate’s previous political record (Bernhardt and Ingberman 1985; Franklin 1991; Enelow and
Munger 1993; Alvarez 1997). Specifically, a candidate’s previous record and positions restrict move-
ment along the ideological space as changes in policy create uncertainty (Alvarez 1997); damaging
a candidate’s chances of election among a risk-adverse voting population. Finally, in the context
of presidential nominations, research finds that primaries lead to the nomination of extreme candi-
dates who, because of reputation or fiscal constraints, are unable to moderate their policy positions
during the general election (Burden 2001, 2004). If multicandidate races exert a centrifugal force
on candidate platforms and candidates are restricted by the positions taken in the primary, then
nomination rules which lengthen partisan competition may lead to more extreme general election
candidates.
This article attempts to expand the literature on presidential primaries by considering how cost
and primary rules affect winnowing and platforms in presidential nomination contests. The next
section presents a model where candidate behavior is dependent upon the primary calendar and the
cost of entering the second primary. In this context, equilibrium platforms and exit decisions are
analyzed to determine the effect of cost and rules on winnowing. While many equilibria exist in
candidate exist decisions, the analysis focuses upon the conditions where there exists a unique equi-
librium in which candidates play strategies consistent with a Losing Candidate Winnowing (LCW)
equilibrium: that is, after the first primary losing candidates always exit and winning candidates
always stay in the election. In general, results indicate that in a front-loaded primary calendar there
exists a cost C and unique equilibrium strategies consistent with the LCW equilibrium. However,
in a back-loaded primary the LCW equilibrium is unique only when candidates place little salience
on candidate platforms.
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6.3 The Model
The model below analyzes candidate behavior in a costly sequential primary: that is, following
the first primary all candidates must pay a cost, C, to remain in the race.4 As candidate actions
are publicly observed, the equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). While
there exist many equilibria to the game, the focus is placed upon finding the conditions in which
the LCW equilibrium is a unique SPNE. The timing of events for a costly sequential primary are
depicted in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Timing of Events
Sincere voters cast ballots in two primaries at t=0 and t=3 as well as the general election at T .
The subscripts t and T are used to distinguish between primaries and the general election. Voters
belong to one of three equal-sized groups: Left party, Right party, or independent; G = {L, I,R}.
The set G has individual elements g where xg and xj represent group ideal points and candidate
platforms along a single dimensional policy space. The ideal points for the Left and Right party are
distributed symmetrically about the ideal point of independent voters; for convenience we assume
xI = 0.
During the primaries voter preferences over the candidates are Euclidean in candidate platforms.
Preferences are also affected by the presence of a stochastic utility shock ηtj which is generated from a
type I extreme value distribution and is independent across both time and candidates. Voter utility
over candidate j at time t is:
ug(xtj , α) = −α(xg − xtj)2 + ηtj (6.1)
4This is a fixed cost that candidates incur simply by being a candidate. The cost is unrelated to candidate effort.
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where
vg(xtj , α) = −α(xg − xtj)2.
The term α assigns the weight voters attach to a candidate’s ideological position; α > 0 is
assumed to be common knowledge and constant throughout the election. Given (6.1) it is possible
to write the probability that a group votes for candidate j from the set of candidates j and k at
time t as:5
pg(xt, α) =
exp(vg(xtj , α))
exp(vg(xtj , α)) + exp(vg(x
t
k, α)).
(6.2)
Voters are sincere and select the party nominee through a closed, sequential primary at t=0
and t=3. Following the first round of primaries but before the second round, candidates may alter
their policy platforms. Any change in a candidate’s platform between t=0 and t=3 is observed by
voters who adjust their beliefs accordingly. It is important to note that voter beliefs over candidate
platforms are fixed before the conclusion of the nomination process. Following the second primary
and the selection of the party nominees voters elect a candidate at T . Conditional upon j obtaining
the party nomination, a group g casts all their ballots, bg, for j at T as follows:
bg =
 j if j ∈ g’s partyj if ugI (xTj , α) > ugI (xTk , α).
Thus, voter behavior during the general election is dependent upon group identification; where
group members behave homogeneously. Partisan voters always vote for their party nominee in the
general election, and independent voters decide the general election.6 This model of voter behavior
in the general election is similar to the voters described in The American V oter (Campbell et
al. 1960) and compatible with empirical evidence which suggests a resurgence of partisan voting
behavior in U.S. presidential elections (Bartels 2000).
6.4 Candidates
In both the Left and Right parties, two office-motivated candidates compete for their party’s
nomination in a costly two-stage primary followed by a general election. The primaries are closed;
i.e., only party identifiers may vote in the primary. Candidates are motivated by the desire to
hold office. All candidates attach the same value to winning office, where the value is normalized
to 1. Candidates compete for office by selecting platforms prior to the first and second primaries.
5Assuming ηtj is drawn i.i.d. and all members within a group observe the same η
t
j this result follows from properties
of the distribution of the η term. See Train (1986).
6Extensions of this model that relax the partisan behavior assumption do not significantly affect the results.
However, relaxing the behavioral assumption requires additional assumptions on the distribution of ηj .
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Candidates are elected to office if the candidate obtains their party nomination by winning both
primaries at t=0,3 and the general election at T . Let W tj be a binary outcome variable where:
W tj =
 0 if j loses the election at time t1 if j wins the election at time t.
Candidates may also obtain their party nomination by winning a single primary and being
nominated by the party elite. The likelihood that the party elite nominates a candidate is dependent
upon the timing of the primary calendar. A front-loaded primary calendar conveys an advantage
to the winner of the earlier contest, whereas a back-loaded primary calendar conveys an advantage
to the winner of the second primary. Let θ ∈ (0 1] be the probability that the candidate who wins
the second primary is nominated by the party elite. Given the above definitions, θ < 12 implies a
front-loaded primary, while θ > 12 implies a back-loaded primary; θ =
1
2 implies a neutral primary
calendar. The value of θ is common knowledge to all candidates.
At t=0, two-candidates from each party enter the contest and select initial platforms in <.
Following candidate entry and platform selection, partisan voters cast their ballots and the election
results are publicly observed. The subscripts 1 and 0 distinguish the winning and losing candidates
from the first round of primaries; j1 and j0. When candidates j and k are accompanied by a
subscript, this will distinguish winning and losing candidates from the two different parties.
Let ht be a history of all election outcomes, candidate actions and the weight voters assign to
the issue space up to t. The binary variable Nj takes a value of 0 if j loses the nomination and 1 if
j wins the nomination. The probability that j wins the nomination after the first primary is:
p(Nj = 1 | θ, h1) =
 θ · p(W 3j0 = 1) if j = j01− θ + θ · p(W 3j1 = 1) if j = j1.
Following the first primary candidates are faced with the action space A1 = {stay, exit}; where
candidates who choose stay pay the cost C. Conditional upon staying in the election candidate j
selects a new platform, x2j ∈ <. Candidates select x2j so as to maximize the joint probability of
winning their party’s nomination and the general election. Thus, at t=2 a candidate maximizes:
E(Uj | θ, h2) = p(WTj = 1 | θ, h2) · p(Nj = 1 | θ, h2). (6.3)
As this is a sequential game with observed actions, we solve for SPNE strategies. While solutions
are solved via backwards induction, equilibrium platforms during candidate entry are presented first
as each candidate possesses a dominate strategy at t=0. Following the description of equilibrium
platforms at t=0, the next section develops the conditions under which pure strategy Nash equilib-
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rium platforms exist at t=2. Following a discussion of several important properties of the equilibrium
platforms at t=2, attention is turned to equilibrium exit strategies.
6.5 Candidate Entry and Equilibrium Platforms
At t=0 two-candidates from each party enter the race and select initial platforms in order to
maximize their probability of winning the first primary. As the next proposition shows all candidates
have a dominant strategy in platform selection at t=0.
Proposition 1 Dominant strategies exit in candidate platform selection at t=0 where candidate j
from the Left party and k from the Right party select x0j = xL and x
0
k = xR.
Proof: Let candidates j and l belong to the same partisan group g. The probability that j wins
the first primary is given by p(W 1j = 1) =
exp(−α(xg−x0j )2)
exp(−α(xg−x0j )2)+exp(−α(xg−x0l )2)
. Taking ∂p(W
1
j =1)
∂x0
j
and
setting it equal to zero, it is the case that p(W 1j = 1) · (1− p(W 1j = 1)) · 2α(xg −xj0) = 0 if and only
if xg = x0j .
Thus, regardless of α or θ all candidates select initial platforms consistent with the party median
voter and each candidate has an equal probability of winning the first primary contest. Given the
existence of a dominant strategy for all candidates at t=0, no candidate has an incentive to deviate
from the strategies in Proposition 1. The next sections present the existence of and location of
equilibrium platforms at t=2. Using these equilibrium platform positions, the expected payoffs to
a candidate’s stay or exit decision are analyzed to examine the existence of a unique equilibrium
where losing candidates exit the election and winning candidates stay.
6.6 Equilibrium Campaign Platforms
After publicly observing the results of the first primary and decisions to stay or exit, a candidate’s
last decision is to select a platform that maximizes the joint probability of winning the nomination
and general election: equation (6.3). Let x2 = (x2j1 , x
2
j0
, x2k1 , x
2
k0
) be a vector of candidate platforms
at t=2 where x̂2 represents a vector of pure strategy Nash equilibrium platforms. At t=2 candidates
select platforms in order to maximize their probability of being elected at T . Taking the partial
derivative of (6.3) with respect to x2j :
∂E(Uj | θ, h2)
∂x2j
=
∂p(WTj = 1 | θ, h2)
∂vI(x2, α)
· ∂vI(x
2, α)
∂x2j
· p(Nj = 1 | θ, h2)
+p(WTj = 1 | θ, h2) ·
∂p(Nj = 1 | θ, h2)
∂vg(x2, α)
· ∂vg(x
2, α)
∂x2j
.
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The implicit solution for a candidate’s optimal platform is conditional upon the outcome of the
first primary. If a candidate wins the first primary, W 0j =1, the implicit solution for a candidate’s
optimal platform is:
x´2j1 =
xg
K1 +K2
· p(W 3j1 = 1 | h2) · (1− p(W 3j1 = 1 | h2)) (6.4)
where
K1 = (1− p(WTj1 = 1 | θ, h2)) · ( 1θ − 1 + p(W 3j1 = 1 | h2))
K2 = p(W 3j1 = 1 | h2) · (1− p(W 3j1 = 1 | h2)).
If j1 runs unopposed in the second primary, then j1 wins the nomination with certainty; p(Nj1 =
1) = 1. It follows directly from (6.4) that if j1 runs uncontested in the second primary, then
x´2j1 = 0 regardless of other candidate platforms. Thus, when unopposed during the second primary
a candidate’s dominant strategy is to adopt a platform identical to the overall median voter.
For a candidate who loses the first primary, W 0j =0, the implicit solution for the candidate’s
optimal platform is:
x´2j0 =
xg
K3 +K4
· p(W 3j0 = 1 | h2) · (1− p(W 3j0 = 1 | h2)) (6.5)
where
K3 = (1− p(WTj0 = 1 | θ, h2)) · p(W 3j0 = 1 | h2))
K4 = p(W 3j0 = 1 | h2) · (1− p(W 3j0 = 1 | h2)).
One important difference between the equilibrium platforms for the winners and losers of the
primary, equations (6.4) and (6.5), is that if at t=3 only one primary is contested, then j0’s optimal
strategy is independent of whether the primary is front- or back-loaded. The loser of the first primary
must be nominated by the party elite and thus θ does not directly affect the losing candidate’s choice
of platform. On the other hand, when j1’s primary is contested at t=3, then j1’s optimal strategy
is always dependent upon θ.
It is trivial to show that when α=0, for all x ∈ <4 the vector of candidate platforms x is a set of
Nash equilibrium platforms. For cases where α >0 the vector of candidate platforms, x̂2, describes
a set of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium platforms if and only if for x˜2j 6= x̂2j :
∀j E(Uj(x˜2j , x̂2−j , α) | θ, h2) ≤ E(Uj(x̂2j , x̂2−j , α) | θ, h2).
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Let fj(x) = x´2j where fj : <4 → < and ej(x) = x´2j where ej : <2 → <. Define T =
[xL, xR] where T 4 (T 2)is a non-empty, closed subset of <4 (<2).7 The vector-valued mapping
f = (fj1(x), fj0(x), fk1(x), fk0(x)) is a mapping from T
4 into T 4 and represents the history where no
candidate exists following the first primary. Similarly, e = (ej1(x), ej0(x)) maps T
2 into T 2 where
x = (xj1 , xj0) and represents the history where one candidate from either the Left or the Right
party exists following the first primary.8 Extending the results of Merrill and Adams (2001) to the
case of a multicandidate sequential election:9
Lemma 6.6.1 If there exists M1 and M2 such that for all x ∈ C4 and y ∈ C2,
max
M1
∑
k 6=j
| ∂fj(x)
∂xk
|≤M1 < 1 and max
M2
∑
k 6=j
| ∂ej(y)
∂xk
|≤M2 < 1 (6.6)
then for all histories h there exists a unique Nash equilibrium strategy x̂j for each candidate in the
election at t=2.
Proof: This lemma is an extension of the results contained in Merrill and Adams (2001). When
the above conditions are met the vector valued functions f and e are contraction mappings on C4
and C2. Uniqueness of these platforms comes from the contraction mapping lemma on <n, which
states that when f or e is a contraction mapping on a closed subset of <n a unique fixed point exists
such that f(x) = x or e(x) = x; see Drager and Foote (1986). By the contraction mapping lemma
on <n, if f and e are contraction mappings on T 4 and T 2 there exist unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium candidate platforms when primaries are competitive at t=2. It was shown above that
when j1 is unopposed in the second primary j1 possesses a dominant strategy at t=2 to adopt the
platform xj1 = 0. Thus, unique pure Nash equilibrium platforms exist ∀h2 ∈ H2 when f and e are
contraction mappings.
It is straightforward that given voter utility functions specified in equation (6.1), the conditions
outlined in Lemma 6.6.1 will not always be met. The weight voters place on a candidate’s platform
is determined by α and as α → ∞ the weight voters place on the stochastic component goes to
zero. Thus, when voters put substantially more weight on the ideological dimension, the model
7Restricting candidate platforms to the interval T = [xL, xR] is a technical assumptions that does not place any
additional restrictions on candidate behavior. For any platform x˜ /∈ T it is shown in the next section that there exists
an x ∈ T that dominates x˜.
8As the candidate in the uncompetitive primary has a dominant strategy, it is necessary to consider only the
actions of the candidates in the contested primary.
9The approach used here to show the conditions under which equilibrium platforms exist at t=2 is similar to that
found in Merrill and Adams (2001). However, there are several distinct differences in the functional form used here
and that found in Merrill and Adams who consider parties or candidates as maximizing their expected vote share over
a single election. Here candidates maximize their probability of winning the general election over sequential elections
and the probability of attaining office is affected by θ. Because candidates make a decision to stay or exit at t=1,
solving for SPNE strategies at t=2 is appropriate only if equilibrium platforms exist regardless of candidate decisions
at t=1. Finally, the random parameter in this model is interpreted as a time-specific random shock rather than a
valence parameter.
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essentially reduces to a multicandidate race over a single dimension; which has no pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium solution (Ordeshook 1986). Using the fsolve computer package inMATLAB and
assuming voter ideal points of {-1,0,1}, simulation results indicate that candidate platforms converge
as long as voters do not weight the ideological dimension 186 times greater than the stochastic
dimension. For each h2 ∈ H2 analyzing the parameters 0 < θ ≤ 1 under different seed values,
candidate platforms converge for 0 < α < 186.4.10 For larger values of α equilibrium platforms
do not exist for all values of θ in a three-candidate race. Thus, while there are limitations to how
ideological voters can be, the upperbound implies that voters can weigh the ideological dimension
186 times greater than the stochastic dimension and equilibrium platforms will exist.
6.7 Properties of Equilibrium Platforms
This section analyzes properties of equilibrium platforms when at least one primary at t=3 is
contested. The following properties are derived from the optimal platforms found in (6.4) and (6.5).
The first lemma in this section states that at t=2 and for any two candidates belonging to the same
party, if one candidate is closer to the general election median voter, then the closer candidate’s
probability of winning the primary at t=2 is lower relative to the other partisan candidate. Fur-
thermore, when the second primary is competitive, the equilibrium platform at t=2 for the winner
of the first primary, j1, is weakly closer to the general election median voter relative to j0. A third
property of any set of equilibrium platforms at t=2 is the expected utility of j1 is weakly greater
than that of j0; where the expected utilities of j1 and j0 are equal only if the primary rules are such
that θ=1. The last proposition states that candidates adopt a platform consistent with the overall
median voter if and only if the second primary is uncontested.
Lemma 6.7.1 For any history h2 and any j, k in the same party if | x2j |<| x2k |, then
p(W 3j = 1) < p(W
3
k = 1).
This lemma follows directly from the properties of equilibrium platforms. In the primary any Left
party candidate platform outside the interval [xL,0] is dominated by a platform inside the interval.
Additionally, during the general election the platform x2j=0=xI dominates all other platforms. Thus,
in equilibrium Left party candidates will only adopt platforms in the interval [xL,0] and Right party
candidates will only adopt platforms in the interval [xR,0].
Proposition 2 For any history h2 in which the second primary is contested, in any set of equilibrium
platforms | x2j1 |<| x2j0 |.
Proof: By contradiction suppose | x2j1 | > | x2j0 |. It is the case that for a given set of equilibrium
platforms; xg · p(W 3j0 = 1) · (1 − p(W 3j0 = 1)) = xg · P (W 2j1 = 1) · (1 − P (W 3j1 = 1)) = A Similarly,
10The θ parameter was increased by increments of .01 while the α parameter was increased by increments of .1
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P(W3j0 = 1) · (1 − P (W 3j0 = 1)) = P (W 3j1 = 1) · (1 − P (W 3j1 = 1)) = D Simplifying equations (6.4)
and (6.5), | x2j1 | > | xj20 | implies that ;
| A
B+D |>|
A
C+D | where B = (θ−1+P (W tj1 = 1))·(1−P (WTj1 = 1)) < P (W tj0 = 1)·(1−P (WTj0 =
1)) = C Recall θ ∈ (0 1] which implies P (W tj0 = 1) < 1θn − 1 + P (W tj1 = 1). Finally, since
| xj1 |>| xj0 | this implies P (WTj1 = 1) < P (WTj0 = 1) which implies that B < C is a contradiction
and thus | xj1 |>| xj0 | is a contradiction.
It follows directly from equilibrium candidate strategies and the proof of Proposition 2 that
P (Nj1 = 1 | θ, h1) ≥ P (Nj0 = 1 | θ, h1). Thus, given the existence of Nash equilibrium platforms
the probability that the winner of the first primary wins the party nomination is greater than or
equal to the probability that the loser of the first primary wins the nomination. More generally, the
following proposition characterizes the expected utility for equilibrium platforms at t=2.
Proposition 3 If x̂2 represents a set of equilibrium platforms at t=2, then E(Uj1(x̂
2)) ≥ E(Uj0(x̂2)).
While the proof to this proposition is a direct result of the proof to Proposition 2, the intuition
for this result is clear. If E(Uj1(x̂
2)) < E(Uj0(x̂
2)), then j1 would always be better off by adopting
a platform equal to the platform of j0. However, j0 does not have the luxury of always being able
to match the platform of j1 as it is necessary that j0 win the second primary.
Proposition 4 For α > 0 and j ∈ g where xg 6=0, the platform x2j1 = xI is a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium platform if and only if j1 is uncontested in the second primary.
Proof:
The sufficient condition follows directly from the fact that p(W 2j = 1)=1 and the conditions for
equilibrium platforms developed in equation (6.4). By equation (6.2) when the second primary is
contested and both candidates pick a platform from the closed interval C, then p(W 3j1 = 1) >0.
Lemma (6.7.1) implies that p(W 3j1 = 1) <1 and thus by equation and equation (6.4) p(W
t
j1
=
1) · (1− p(W tj1 = 1)) 6= 0 Thus, when pure strategy Nash equilibrium platforms exist and the second
primary is contested the numerator is never equal to zero, and xj1 6= xI .
Taken together Lemma 6.7.1 and Proposition 2 present a disconcerting picture of sequential
primaries. When primary rules are such that θ 6= 1 the loser of the first primary, who is the more
extreme candidate, is more likely to win the second primary. Thus, when the second primary is
contested, there is a greater than 50% chance that party elites will decide the party nominee. Finally,
by Proposition 4 a failure to winnow candidates following the first primary results in candidates
adopting a more extreme platform for the primary at t=3 and the general election at T .
Assuming convergence to the median voter is desirable, the proof to Proposition 2 states that
the moderate partisan candidate is more likely to win the nomination. Furthermore, Proposition 3
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states that following candidate exit decisions at t=1, the expected utilities for the winners of the first
primary are always (weakly) greater than those of the losing candidates. By exploiting the difference
in the expected utilities of j1 and j0, there may exist a common cost C across candidates and histories
that winnows losing candidates following the first primary. Assuming α > 0, Proposition 4 states
that candidates will adopt equilibrium platforms consistent with the median voter theorem if and
only if the second primary is uncontested. The next section analyzes equilibrium strategies of the
t=1 subgame where candidates must choose whether to exit or stay in the race.
6.8 Candidate Winnowing
This section investigates equilibrium candidate strategies in which winnowing occurs following
the first primary. Winnowing occurs as candidates exit the race to avoid paying the cost C of
running in later primaries. This fixed cost is similar to the cost candidates incur to: retain their
campaign staff, put their name on the ballot in upcoming elections, move their campaign staff to
the next state and file necessary documentation with the Federal Election Commission.11 At t=1,
equilibrium strategies are dependent upon the expected payoffs to the candidates at t=2 and the
cost C. The first condition for SPNE strategies at t=1 to exist is that equilibrium platforms must
exist during the campaign phase at t=2. Given this is a finite game with observed actions, if there
exist equilibrium strategies at t=2, then by Nash (1950) there exists at least one equilibrium to the
sequential game. If equilibrium platforms do not exist at t=2, then candidate exit decisions do not
have a clear mapping to expected payoffs and additional assumptions on candidate behavior are
necessary to analyze candidate behavior.
Varying the cost C results in different equilibrium exit strategies, where some of these equilibria
are more interesting than others. For instance given a sufficiently large (low) cost no candidates will
enter (leave) the second primary. In general it is trivial to show that there exists a range of costs
where equilibrium strategies result in candidate winnowing. Given the value of office is normalized to
one and 12 < C ≤ 1, in equilibrium only one candidate remains in the election. Additional equilibria
exist where the second primaries are uncontested, but either the winner or loser of the first primary
stays in the election. The focus in this section is in establishing the conditions under which the
LCW equilibrium is the unique SPNE.
After observing the election results at t=1, the action space for all candidates is A1j = {stay,exit};
where all candidates choosing to remain in the race must pay the same cost C. A candidate’s pure
strategy sj is a series of maps stj : h
t → atj ; let σtj : ht → atj denote a mixture over the strategy
space. Candidate decisions to stay or exit are simultaneous and public. Following public observation
of candidate decisions to stay or exit, all remaining candidates adopt new policy platforms x2j . The
11In the model developed here it is necessary that candidates do not receive benefits either today or in the future
from these payments.
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term uncompetitive primary is used to denote a history where a candidate exits the race following
a loss in the first round. As candidates make exit decisions only once, the time superscript will be
dropped when it is clear the strategy is over exit decisions. The objective of this section is to find the
conditions under which the LCW equilibrium exists. Let s and s˜ represent the following strategies:
s = (stayj1 , stayj0 , stayk1 , exitk0) and s˜ = (stayj1 , stayj0 , stayk1 , stayk0).
Proposition 5 When E(Uj1(s) | θ, h1) > E(Uj0(s˜) | θ, h1) there exists a cost
C = E(Uj1(s) | θ, h1) such that the LCW equilibrium is the unique SPNE.
Proof: The proof will proceed in two parts. First, it will be shown that
min
H2
E(Uj1 | θ, | h2) = E(Uj1(stay1j1 , stay1j0 , stay1k1 , exit1k0) | θ, h2). (6.7)
Part 1: As candidates have dominant strategies when running unopposed, it does not matter
which candidate k1 or k0 stays in the election. Let s1 be the strategy profile s1 = (stay1j1 , stay
1
j0
, stay1k1 , exit
1
k0
)
and
s˜1 = (stay1j1 , stay
1
j0
, stay1k1 , stay
1
k0
), it needs to be shown that E(Uj1(s
1)) ≥ E(Uj1(s˜1)). By equation
(6.4) given the strategy profile s1 candidate k1 has a dominant strategy in platform selection where
xk1 = 0. Given voter utility functions described in (6.1):
∀xj ∈ < p(WTj (xj , 0) = 1 | xk = 0) < p(W tj (xj , xk) = 1 | xk 6= 0). (6.8)
Suppose E(Uj1(s˜
1)) > E(Uj1(s
1)): p(W˜Tj1) · (1− θ + θ · p(W˜ 3j1)) > p(WTj1) · (1− θ + θ · p(W 3j1)).
Rearranging terms:
p(W˜ 3j1) >
1
θ ·
(
p(WTj1 )
p(W˜T
j1
)
· (1− θ + θ · p(W 3j1))− 1
)
+ 1 = 1θ ·
(
p(WTj1 )
p(W˜T
j1
)
· p(Nj1 = 1)− 1
)
+ 1
Given (6.8) it is the case that
p(WTj1 )
p(W˜T
j1
)
≥ 1. Additionally, as a direct result of the proof to Proposition
2 it was shown that p(Nj1 = 1) ≥ 12 . Thus, it is the case that p(W˜ 3j1) > 12 which is a contradiction
of Lemma 6.7.1 and Proposition 2 and therefore it is the case that E(Uj1(s
1)) ≥ E(Uj1(s˜1)).
Given observed actions map to unique Nash equilibrium payoffs, the proof when j0 and/or k0
play mixed strategies is similar to the above proof and is left to the reader to show that
E(Uj1(stay
1
j1
, stay1j0 , stay
1
k1
, exit1k0) | θ, h2) > E(Uj1(stay1j1 , σ1j0 , stay1k1 , σk01) | θ, h2).
Part 2:
Let E(Uj1(stayj1 , stayj0 , stayk1 , exitk0) | θ, h1) = C, it is trivial that when C is greater than
j0’s maximum expected utility across all history profiles, then regardless of the actions of k0
the expected utility to j0 of staying in the race is negative and j0 will exit. Recall that in
any set of SPNE strategies, each history at t=1 maps to a unique Nash equilibrium platform
at t=2 and thus a unique expected payoff. Suppose the maximum expected payoff to j0 oc-
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curs under the strategy profile (stayj1 , stayj0 , stayk1 , exitk0). By Proposition 3 it is the case that
E(Uj1(stayj1 , stayj0 , stayk1 , exitk0) > E(Uj0(stayj1 , stayj0 , stayk1 , exitk0) and thus by the first part
of the proof there exists a cost C such that the LCW equilibrium is the unique SPNE. Suppose the
maximum expected payoff to j0 occurs under the strategy profile (stayj1 , stayj0 , stayk1 , stayk0). If
C ≤ E(Uj0(stay1j1 , stay1j0 , stay1k1 , stay1k0) | θ, h1), then in equilibrium both j0 and k0 will pay C and
run in the second primary. If C = E(Uj1(stay
1
j1
, stay1j0 , stay
1
k1
, stay1k0) | θ, h1) > E(Uj0(stay1j1 , stay1j0 , stay1k1 , stay1k0) |
θ, h1), then given j1 and k1 are playing the equilibrium strategies stay neither j0 or k0 have any
incentive to remain in the race.
The intuition for the existence and uniqueness of the LCW equilibrium is that across all histories
of candidate exit decisions, the minimum expected utility for j1 must be greater than the maximum
expected utility for j0. By Proposition 3, for any strategy profile the expected utility to j1 is always
greater than that of j0. Thus, it is necessary to only consider expected payoffs for j1 and j0 under
different histories and determine if the expected utility for j1 is greater than the expected utility for
j0. The proof of the above proposition shows that the minimum expected utility for j1 always occurs
under the strategy profile (stayj1 , stayj0 , stayk1 , exitk0). Therefore, a LCW equilibrium exists if the
expected utility to j0 under the strategy profile (stayj1 , stayj0 , stayk1 , stayk0) is greater than the
minimum expected utility for j1.
While less intuitive a rearrangement of Proposition 5 changes the first part of the statement to
1
θ >
p(WTj0 (e))·p(W
t
j0
(e))
p(WT
j1
(f)) + p(W
t
j0
(f)). For θ = 1 partisan candidates will adopt identical platforms,
and therefore a LCW equilibrium will never exist. On the other hand, for θ = 0 there always exists
a LCW equilibrium as the expected utility to j0 for staying in the race is zero. The existence and
uniqueness of the LCW equilibrium is dependent upon the primary calendar, θ, and voter ideological
salience, α. Figure 6.2 below plots the ranges of α and θ over which there exists a cost C such that
the LCW is a unique equilibrium.
For all parameter values (θ, α) to the left of the plotted line in Figure 6.2, there exists a cost C such
that there is a unique SPNE where candidates play strategies according to the LCW equilibrium.
The implications of Figure 6.2 are clear. In a front-loaded primary calendar, even when voters
place significant weight upon the ideological dimension, there exists a cost C such that the LCW
equilibrium is a unique SPNE. For a back-loaded primary calendar, θ 6=1, when voters weight
candidate platforms moderately greater than the stochastic shock there does exist a cost C such
that the LCW equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. The next section uses simulated equilibrium
platforms to analyze the effect of candidate winnowing on equilibrium platforms at t=2 under
different primary rules and calendars.
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Figure 6.2: Existence of cost C and a unique LCW equilibrium
6.9 Winnowing and Behavior
After eliminating boundary values, Proposition 4 states that through winnowing the utility of the
overall median voter is maximized. The above section focused upon the existence and uniqueness of
an equilibrium where, after the first election, losing candidates always exit and winning candidates
always stay. In this section simulated equilibrium platforms are analyzed to determine how primary
rules and the existence of a unique LCW equilibrium affect candidate placement. Considering a
neutral primary rule (θ = 12 ), equilibrium platforms for three different types of primaries are de-
picted in Figures 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5. Equilibrium platforms are plotted along the x-axis for various
levels of α with group ideal points of {−1, 0, 1}. Figure 6.3 depicts equilibrium platforms when can-
didates compete in a single primary followed by a general election.12 Figure 6.4 presents equilibrium
platforms when candidates compete in a costless sequential primary followed by a general election.
Finally, Figure 6.5 presents equilibrium candidate platforms under a hybrid primary structure. The
hybrid primary structure implements a costly sequential primary when the LCW equilibrium is the
unique SPNE and a costless sequential primary for all other values of α.13
The simulated equilibrium platforms presented in Figures 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 depict three main
differences between equilibrium platforms under the different primary rules. First, when candidates
compete in a single primary followed by a general election, partisan candidates adopt identical
platforms consistent with a point halfway between the party and independent voter ideal points.
Under the assumption that a candidate’s primary platform locks in a candidate’s general election
12Candidates adopt a single platform prior to the first primary.
13Discussion of equilibrium refinement when the LCW equilibrium is not unique is avoided here as it is the subject
of another chapter in my dissertation which deals with candidate quality and signaling.
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Figure 6.3: Equilibrium Platforms: One Primary θ = 12
Figure 6.4: Equilibrium Platforms: Sequential Primary θ = 12
Figure 6.5: Equilibrium Platforms: Hybrid Sequential Primary θ = 12
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platform, the distance between independent voters and equilibrium candidate platforms is greater
under a single primary relative to sequential primaries.
The key difference between candidate platforms under the sequential and hybrid primary rules
is that the most divergent platforms under sequential primaries are replaced by platforms consistent
with the median voter theorem in the hybrid primary structure. This relationship arises because for
low values of α there exists a cost C such that the LCW equilibrium is the unique SPNE. However,
as the value of α rises, the conditions in Proposition 5 are no longer met: there no longer exists a cost
C such that losing candidates always exit and winning candidates always stay. The interpretation
of this last point is that the LCW equilibrium will not be unique when voters put significant weight
on the ideological space.14
As shown above, the timing of the primary calendar impacts candidate winnowing, and therefore
equilibrium candidate platforms. Figures 6.6–6.9 plot equilibrium candidate platforms in the context
of back-loaded and front-loaded primary calendars. As discussed earlier for large values of θ and
modest values of α there does not exist a C such that the LCW equilibrium is unique. Analyzing
the platforms in Figure 6.7 this last point is observed as there is only a small interval of α such
that equilibrium candidate platforms coincide with the overall median voter. In the context of the
back-loaded primary calendar, when the LCW equilibrium is unique voters place little weight on the
ideological dimension. On the other hand, Figure 6.9 plots simulated equilibrium platforms under
the hybrid sequential primary for a front-loaded primary. For θ = 13 , there exists a C such that the
LCW equilibrium is unique over the entire range of α analyzed; resulting in equilibrium candidate
platforms at t=2 that coincide with the median voter theorem.
Figure 6.6: Equilibrium Platforms: Sequential Primary θ = 23
14This last point may help to explain the lack of candidate exit in the 2008 Democratic nomination contest.
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Figure 6.7: Equilibrium Platforms: Hybrid Sequential Primary θ = 23
Figure 6.8: Equilibrium Platforms: Sequential Primary θ = 13
Figure 6.9: Equilibrium Platforms: Hybrid Sequential Primary θ = 13
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6.10 Discussion
Despite numerous findings that suggest multicandidate elections lead to divergent equilibrium
platforms, the literature has largely overlooked the development of rules and institutions that pro-
mote the winnowing or elimination of candidates during the presidential nomination contests. Under
the hypothesis that candidates with poor electoral prospects will be less willing to incur the cost
of running, a model is developed where after the first primary all candidates must pay a common,
fixed cost or be eliminated from the nomination process. When candidates are restricted by their
primary platforms and winnowing occurs early in the nomination contest, results show the party
nominee adopts a more moderate platform during the second primary. Adoption of moderate plat-
forms during the primary may be important given findings that candidate movement during the
general election is restricted by the candidate’s primary campaign (Burden 2001, 2004).
This article considers whether a fixed cost will result in voluntary candidate exit or winnowing
following the first primary. Findings indicate the existence of multiple costs and equilibrium strate-
gies that result in winnowing after the first primary. The article focuses on the existence of a cost C
such that the unique SPNE is the Losing Candidate Winnowing (LCW) equilibrium: that is, after
the first primary losing candidates are winnowed and winning candidates always stay. The existence
and uniqueness of the LCW equilibrium is found to be dependent upon the expected payoffs of: (A)
the winner of the first primary when only her second primary is contested and (B) the loser of the
first primary when both primaries are contested. Results show that when (A) > (B), there exists a
cost C=(A) such that the LCW equilibrium is the unique SPNE. It is shown that the uniqueness
of the LCW equilibrium is largely dependent upon whether the primary calendar is front- or back-
loaded; where the LCW equilibrium is unlikely to be unique in a back-loaded primaries. While not
considered here, given the above results it is likely that in open primaries a cost C and unique LCW
equilibrium will exist over greater values of voter issue salience and back-loaded primaries relative
to closed primaries. Finally, analytic and simulation methods find that equilibrium platforms are
more moderate when winnowing occurs after the first round.
The above results are particularly relevant in today’s political atmosphere where voting rights
groups and elites are calling for primary reform. In 2008, Iowa moved their caucus up by about
two weeks relative to 2004, but many states such as Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas,
Louisiana, and Wyoming moved their 2008 primary or caucus up by at least one month. This race to
the front of the primary calendar has resulted in a front-loaded primary process where the majority
of delegates are assigned to candidates soon after the first caucus is held. The increasingly front-
loaded nature of the nomination process has prompted calls for reform from voting rights activists
and political elites such as Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Republican Party Rules Committee
Chairman David Norcross. One of the main complaints leveled against the current nomination
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process is the unsubstantiated claim that a front-loaded nomination process reduces information
transmission by accelerating the candidate winnowing process. Results suggest that when ignoring
information effects, the impact of a back-loaded primary calendar is likely to lengthen the time
over which candidates are winnowed; when candidates do not exit following a primary victory. The
increased length of the winnowing process may result in more extreme general election candidates
and a higher likelihood of party elites selecting the nominee. Thus, greater study is needed of the
costs and benefits of proposed alternatives to the current primary process, such as the Delaware,
American, and Regional primary plans, which call for a back-loaded primary calendar.
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